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America's Far Eastern Policy

THE SPECIAL SECTION on the Far East which accompanies this issue of the *New Republic* conveys as a whole two strong impressions: one, that a revolution is essential not only in Japan but also in China, if the war is to be won with the utmost possible speed and is to be followed by a durable peace; the other, that a much clearer line than is now discernible must be followed by the Western powers with regard to colonies and dependencies. This consensus was not the result of any editorial policy or advance consultation. It is all the more remarkable because contributions were invited only on the basis of the first-hand expertness of the several contributors, each of whom wrote without knowledge of what the others would say.

As in the case of Germany, it is not enough to seek merely a surrender of the military in Japan, or a change in the persons having political power. Democracy is of course a basic requirement of any real shift in direction. But even democracy could scarcely prevent a recrudescence of the old tendencies unless something is done about the industries on which military power is based and whose owners have abetted armed imperialism.

As in the case of Germany, it will not do permanently to destroy Japanese industry itself, though of course the manufacture of armaments must be prohibited. An industrial nation cannot live without the ability to continue machine production and exchange its products abroad. Any attempt to force it to do so, even if for a while it could be carried out, would be

sure to fail in the end and would only plant the seeds of future trouble. What is necessary is to democratize the ownership and control of industry, to end its power for domestic exploitation. If the Japanese will revolt to achieve this end, they should be encouraged rather than restrained in the interest of "law and order."

Just as important is the course of internal affairs in China, which so far is only potentially one of the "Big Four." If there is to be any future balance in Asia, China must be so strong as to curb at the beginning any Japanese penetration of the continent, rather than being, as in the past, so weak as to invite it. It has been convincingly demonstrated during the course of the war that a China divided between the Kuomintang and the Communists will not develop the necessary strength. If they can unite and solve their difficulties through a common democracy, good, but if they cannot do so, a choice must be made by the Western powers.

Solution of this problem seems to be necessary even for the intervention of Russia, which could make a tremendous difference to the cost of victory in American lives. The Soviet Union, if it has to choose, probably will not pick the Chungking regime, and with good reason. But for the sake of Allied unity it probably will not enter the war even on the side of the Chinese Communists, so long as the United States and Britain back Chungking. We must face this issue, not only as a matter of grand strategy, but also in order to make possible the industrialization and democratization of

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China, without which we cannot guarantee the world against a revival of Japanese imperialism.

Of hardly less importance is a good program for the liquidation of European imperialism in the Far East, which also invited Japanese aggression, and which has now suffered a fatal blow to its prestige. Armed victory alone will not permit it to resume where it was interrupted by the invasions of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." No doubt the inhabitants of Burma, Malaya, Indo-China and the East Indies would prefer the British, French or Dutch as rulers, to the Japanese, but they will not long be satisfied with a colonial status either politically or economically, any more than will the inhabitants of India.

Nor is the solution so simple as merely to make a promise of independence, as we have discovered in the Philippines. Even the greatest nations are discovering that they are interdependent; independence alone is a nineteenth-century ideal unsuited to a world which is now drawing closer together. Independence, in so far as it signifies the abandonment of a one-sided dependence, is a condition of national self-respect and a powerful bulwark of good will and coöperation. But it can be real only in a world knit together both economically and for defense against military aggression.

We granted Philippine aspirations for independence

only at the price of thrusting the Filipinos outside the American tariff wall; if we retain both this condition and protection we shall force them to choose poverty with freedom. Moreover, no nation is ultimately without concern for the internal structure of another; it is possible to argue, as many Britishers are beginning to do, that a socialist British government could do more for India as a part of the Empire than by abandoning its desperately oppressed population to the native princes and the capitalists, and to the deeply undemocratic caste system. What we really should aim at is not so much independence as equality of status, accompanied by the institutions under which equality may be maintained. What we must everywhere oppose is rule exercised through inequality and exploitation, whether the exploiters are alien or native.


There is no easy solution to this problem. In itself it will demand both imaginative boldness and wisdom. Above all, we must come to it with something more than a traditional stock of phrases and institutions of our own. A world riven by war and depression can scarcely say to backward and dependent peoples, "Let us lead you by the hand until you have risen to the level where you can become one of us." Nations intent upon protecting only their own commercial interests are scarcely suitable as trustees, whether acting individually or collectively. Our first duty to the world is to heal ourselves. In so far as we fulfill the implications of democracy and equality within our own borders, we shall be competent to offer guidance to others.

Military Review

MEN AT THE FRONT, especially in the Pacific, complain that the people back home have not the slightest conception of what goes on out there, and the complaint is at the basis of the widening non-comprehension between civilian and returning soldier which has been remarked by several observers. The spectacular stories of the saving of the aircraft-carrier Franklin furnish a good instance of what they mean.

Reference to the papers of the date when she was hit show headlines spreading across the front pages about the damage done to shipping in the Inland Sea with details of the carrier strikes there. The Franklin affair, with all its horror and heroism, appears only as a single line which the correspondents pick up from the official communiqué—"One of our ships was seriously damaged, but is now proceeding to port under her own power."

Quite evidently, if the civilian population fails to comprehend the character of the war and to give it that more effective support for which the military chiefs are always appealing, it is at least partly because the data for comprehension have been denied. The release of the Franklin story as soon as the ship reached



The Hard Tip

For a month the Japanese have succeeded in holding static the position from Naha across to Yonabaru, with Shuri height as its center and dominating feature. As a result the campaign has become one of attrition, in which geography is less important than casualty figures. Part of the difficulty has been due to the fact that there are no outlying islands within easy gun-range of the position which the army could use for its favorite method of emplacing artillery to strike at the enemy positions from a distance; and part is due to the rugged character of the southern coast, which prevents landings in the rear or any form of maneuver.

New York marks a welcome change of policy; in previous cases release came so long after the event that the latter had lost its news value by the time it got to the public. The antecedent circumstances also emphasize far more clearly than the story itself how much of a war still remains to be fought in the Pacific.

At about the time the carrier was taking those deadly bomb-hits, Admiral King was telling the House Committee on Appropriations that West Coast yards were being cleared of all construction work for the repair of battle damage. The capacity of those yards is very considerable (those in the state of Washington alone produced 21 escort carriers in less than a single year), but the fact that the Franklin was sent around to Brooklyn, already desperately busy with the two big carriers recently launched there, suggests that the West Coast establishments are fairly well occupied with damaged ships that did not make the headlines. At the same time the Philadelphia yard announces a drive for 1,600 mechanics to rush the completion of the carriers Valley Forge and Princeton, and there is additional confirmation of the damage done by Jap air attacks from the Pacific itself.

The navy casualty figures for the Okinawa operation were announced as 3,978 killed and 3,958 wounded. There has been no gunnery action on the sea; no surface or subsurface torpedo attacks have been mentioned; and the fleet is so capable of outranging shore batteries that it is unlikely that anything but the most insignificant proportion of these casualties trace to such a source. The proportion of killed to wounded also suggests the results of air attack. The important statistical feature is that on the Franklin, which was exceptionally hard-hit, the total dead were 832. Okinawa has already multiplied this figure by five and the suggestion as to the accompanying amount of material damage in the fleet is obvious.

On land the case is much the same. It turned out that Guam headquarters was a trifle premature in its announcement that the Japanese lines had been broken, and the casualties on the island, not including the navy, are now around the 23,000 mark—very nearly two complete divisions put out of action in a total of seven. This is well above the 20 percent which is cited in military texts as the maximum allowable before it is necessary to take a command out of action and reform it, and it indicates that the Tenth Army may have to be reinforced before it can finish the job.

At the same time there is evidence from Germany on the question of how far the Japanese capacity to resist can be destroyed by air from Okinawa or any other place. Correspondents there have been allowed to go through and report on some of the underground factories in the "national redoubt"; at least seven have been mentioned and one, described in detail, was an elaborate plant for making jet-fighters, staffed by 23,000 slaves. Its existence was not even suspected by the

Allies, so well had it been camouflaged, and it was in full operation up to the moment the Seventh Army made the capture. The Germans remarked mournfully that this type of construction had been started too late to do any good; in Japan, the official spokesman was telling his people more than a year ago that they would have to go underground, not metaphorically, and everywhere they have been encountered, the Japanese have shown an extraordinary capacity for burrowing.

There is less and less possibility of finding any substitute for a major military campaign in Japan.

Progress at San Francisco

The American delegation at San Francisco has now explained its unfortunate stand against conceding that "independence" is a desirable ideal, and putting that fact into the charter of the new security organization. The Americans say they are in favor of steps toward self-government, which might end in independence if the people involved should want it, or might not. It is true that political independence seems less important than it did fifty years ago; today we recognize interdependence as the chief goal, and see that economic prosperity is also a major ambition. Nevertheless, it is a great pity the Americans at San Francisco bungled their statement so that word went around the world that this country opposes "independence."

It is also a pity that we did not make ourselves more clear in our opposition to the Russian formula that every man is entitled to "the right to work." We even object, it seems, to letting the international organization "promote full employment." The reason is said to be fear that the American Senate would take fright lest the world organization interfere with our domestic affairs in furtherance of this aim. But the proposed language would seem about as harmless as it could be; and we again stand indicted before the world as excessively timorous, excessively conservative.

On the other hand, it is good news that the questions of trusteeship and regional security have been successfully solved at San Francisco and that the Conference is going on with its task to set up an effective international security organization. The compromise reached on the regional question does not in any way weaken, but rather supplements, the powers of the international organization. One of the major weaknesses of the old League of Nations was the failure of its Covenant to provide for regional guarantees against aggression, to be enforced, and for all practical purposes enforceable, only by those powers geographically close to the theatre of war.

Mr. Rankin and the Veterans

Representative John E. Rankin has discovered, we trust and hope, an infallible way to be defeated for reelection to Congress. For many months now, there have been well substantiated charges that things are

seriously wrong with the Veterans' Administration, particularly in the handling of men in the veterans' hospitals. Among those who have brought forward well documented studies of the conditions is Albert Deutsch of the newspaper *PM*. Mr. Rankin is chairman of the House Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation, which is supposed to be conducting an inquiry into this matter. From the first, however, it has seemed as though Mr. Rankin's main interest was to whitewash the Veterans' Administration and to keep any of its employees from giving information which might damage its unjustified prestige. When Mr. Deutsch was summoned to testify, Mr. Rankin showed no interest whatever in putting his disturbing facts into the record, and a great deal of interest in finding out the names and addresses of Mr. Deutsch's informants. When the newspaperman, naturally, refused to violate a confidence, Mr. Rankin threatened to send him to jail for contempt. With no ill will to Mr. Deutsch, we hope the Representative from Mississippi will make good his threat. It will help call the situation to the attention of the country and perhaps improve the intolerable conditions in the VA. And meanwhile, we trust that when Rankin of Tupelo comes up for reelection a year from November, his callousness toward the sufferings of the veterans will be remembered by every soldier, every former soldier, and every friend or relative of a soldier, in his district.

Lend-Lease for Russia

Do we want Russia to help win the war against Japan, or don't we? If the answer is that we do, somebody ought to tell the State Department about it. Apparently the Department has been doing its best to stop Lend-Lease shipments to Russia, on the ground that that country is not now at war with Japan. It is obvious that Lend-Lease was not intended by Congress to continue into the postwar period. It is also obvious that this is not the postwar period, so far as Japan is concerned. Russia is at present pinning down at least half a million crack Japanese troops along the Siberian border; she has denounced her non-aggression treaty with the Japanese, and press comment in Moscow on Japan has taken a thoroughly unfriendly tone. Getting Russia into the war with Japan may easily shorten that war by months or years and save the lives of many thousands of American soldiers. If there was ever a time to interpret the law liberally, now would seem to be the moment; yet both in Washington and San Francisco, some of our officials appear to be doing everything they can to isolate the Russians. Washington gossip says the State Department's action was taken without President Truman's knowledge or consent and that the President forced the subsequent partial withdrawal of the order. It is worth remembering that the Russophobes in the State Department are apparently still there, still active, still venomous.

The Freight-Rate Decision

The sweeping decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission to equalize "class" freight rates as between the East on the one hand and the South and the West on the other, goes far to remedy a discrimination of long standing. "Class" rates apply chiefly to manufactured goods, and the former discrepancy, by favoring Eastern and Northern manufacturers, obstructed the growth of industry in the South and West. The revolt against it has been active for a long time, and has taken political form, as well as being advanced by monopoly charges brought before the Supreme Court, through the instrumentality of Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia. Indications are that the fight is not over. Now the Eastern manufacturers are likely to use the influence available to them in order to overturn or obstruct the decision. Meanwhile there are other rates to be considered. In commodity rates the South and West, as producers of raw materials, already have an advantage. But there is a no-man's land between class rates and commodity rates which remains untouched, and in which the less industrialized regions have a grievance.

The ultimate significance of a decision of this sort is so great that it is difficult to estimate it at first sight. Neither under the law nor according to practice has the Interstate Commerce Commission ever used its rate-making power as a means of economic strategy or planning. Rates have grown up by tradition and in response to the arguments of railroads and shippers. They were supposed to be "fair" to shippers and to yield a "fair return." Now the ICC has clearly responded to political pressure. In this instance the pressure seems to have accorded with the national interest. We should, however, regret to see the function of regulation thrown into Congress and the courts. We urgently need expert regulation. It should be coordinated with national planning, of which freight-rate policy is only a part.

Gold Scandal in China

China decided to revalue the gold value of her currency; the decision was known in advance to important members of the government; they used the time intervening between the decision and the announcement to make huge profits. This sort of thing has been done in other countries, if not by public officials at least by private money magnates. We might never have heard of it in this instance if the occasion for the breach of confidence had not been a gold loan from the United States. That it should be done in wartime, however, and by leaders of a nation in extreme straits, which we are trying to help with the blood of our soldiers, is a striking commentary on the character of the Chungking regime. This incident fits other things we have heard of that regime—that it is, under the influ-

ence of profiteers who will not take the steps necessary to curb inflation and release the full fighting energies of the Chinese people; that it is more afraid of the Chinese Communists than of the Japanese invaders.

Bad Faith in Greece

Some five months ago British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden promised in the House of Commons that a unity government would be formed in Greece with a program of reconciliation and representation of the EAM, the liberation movement whose exclusive claim to power had been aborted by British armed intervention. Up to now nothing has been done in this direction. On the contrary, the change from the government of General Plastiras to that of Premier Petros Voulgaris has been a change from bad to worse. The present government has just issued a warrant for the arrest of General Stefanos Sarafis, commander of ELAS, the EAM's military units which played such a triumphant part in the liberation of their homeland, and a number of other popular leaders. In the course of one month, from April 4 to May 5, 4,100 violations of the Varkiza Agreement which had ended the hostilities in Greece were reported, including cases of interference with the freedom of the press, illegal raids, destruction of EAM headquarters, discrimination in the formation of the National Guard and intimidation during trade-union elections. Democratic gendarmerie and army officers who during the German occupation left their posts and joined the guerrillas, are being tried for "desertion." On the other hand, Royalist military leagues are permitted to operate freely, and former officers of the quisling Security Battalions are given army promotions instead of being purged.

How the Greek people continue to feel appears from some returns of recent trade-union elections. Candidates of ERGAS, the Anti-Fascist Federation of Workers, won an overwhelming vote of confidence over those of the "official" Greek Labor Federation in seven out of nine unions, in spite of terror, arrests and active interference by the police in the pre-election campaign. We agree with our British contemporary, the London *New Statesman and Nation*, that "the final verdict will depend on our making a genuine effort to achieve the reconciliation we promised. It will not come while we tolerate a White Terror as a preparation for the coming plebiscite."

The Bell Tolls for Franco

The arrival in this country of Dr. Juan Negrín, the last Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic which was destroyed by the fascist and betrayed by the democratic powers, promises an early solution to the complex question of unity among Republican Spain's many exiled parties and factions. Such unity is the more necessary since a governmental change in Spain cannot

be avoided much longer. Fascism in Spain is not so much a danger as it is an anachronism. General Franco's time has long been up. But if the alternative to his rule is to be a new democratic republic and not, as British and American conservatives in high places may wish, a reactionary, possibly monarchist-clerical regime, the creation of a democratic government-in-exile, legally possible under the Spanish Constitution of 1931 and with Negrín as Premier, is an immediate necessity. Such a government, effectively backed by liberal opinion in this country and Britain as well as by Russia—whose attitude toward Franco has always been unequivocally hostile—will be the best safeguard against a repetition of the Darlan-Badoglio-Plastiras policy in Spain after Franco's demise.

Boundaries by Fait Accompli

THE TRIESTE INCIDENT—its background and a possible solution are discussed elsewhere in this issue by Professor Salvemini—is not the only instance of a nation's attempt to establish its postwar boundaries by confronting the world with a *fait accompli*. The Poles, with Russian backing, are trying it in eastern Germany in spite of the fact that the Yalta Agreement, quite conspicuously, refrained from mentioning any definite line for the future Polish-German frontier. The French are trying it at Italy's Riviera and Piedmont border where they have occupied the valleys of Tenda, Aosta and Susa. The Greeks are trying it in the Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes.

Whatever the merits of their claims, the unilateral actions of these nations are contrary to the more intelligent and enduring method of settling controversial boundaries by peaceful means. The problem, as Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew so forcefully stated in connection with the Italo-Yugoslav dispute over Venezia Giulia, "is far more than a mere frontier controversy between two claimants. It raises the issue of



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the settlement of international disputes by orderly process rather than unilateral action. The disposition of Venezia Giulia, as of other disputed territories, must therefore await a definite peace settlement in which the claims of both sides and the peoples concerned will receive a full and fair hearing or be made a matter of direct negotiations freely entered into between the parties involved. . . . There are thirty or more territorial questions in Europe that require careful study before satisfactory decisions can be reached."

The Yugoslav action in Venezia Giulia is the more deplorable because it is in clear violation of an agreement reached last February between Marshal Tito and the Western powers for control and administration of the disputed province by the Allied Military Government. By not observing this agreement, Marshal Tito has considerably undermined much of the universal admiration and prestige that he had previously enjoyed. Nor can it be argued that military necessity voided the agreement. The political objective of the Yugoslav action appears from a speech by Dr. Ante Mandich, one of Yugoslavia's Regents, broadcast over the Belgrade radio as recently as May 11. He declared that "by the occupation of Trieste and Gorizia our heroic army demarcated new Yugoslavia's western frontier. . . . For we have learned from friend and foe alike that borders are written with blood, not ink. This means that we are prepared to defend them with the same unrelenting ferocity as that with which we have been fighting against the occupying forces for four stern years."

This statement not only casts doubt on the alleged liberal and democratic intentions of the Yugoslav Partisan movement, but in our eyes compares most unfavorably with Acting Secretary Grew's politically wise declaration that the disposition of Venezia Giulia should not be "through sudden unilateral action taken in the flush of victory." The Yugoslav action has made more difficult a just solution of a very complicated territorial question, such as is suggested by Professor Salvemini. It has also had the immediate effect of causing a new wave of nationalism in Italy. Moreover, under the terms of the Italian armistice of September, 1943, the disputed area is legally still Italian. The Yugoslavs' allegation that they were not a party to that armistice and that they crossed the border of an enemy rather than a friendly or neutral neighbor, is sheer sophistry. Finally, if it were true that the Italian population of Trieste wants to join Yugoslavia—as Tito is reported to have said in Moscow—we cannot see in the Yugoslav procedure any difference from that applied by Adolf Hitler to the Sudeten Czechs and all the other minorities which he "liberated" by conquering their countries. We also believe that the "General Assembly," just held in Trieste and hailed by the Yugoslav-controlled newspaper *Nostro Avvenire* "as an historic manifestation of true

democracy," is an obvious phony. It was, Milton Bracker reported in the *New York Times*, unknown to the average Italian in the street.

Two questions remain. Does Marshal Tito have Russian backing in his attempt to force the issue of Venezia Giulia by a *coup de main*? And is the dispute a problem of British versus Russian imperialism? As to the former, it may well be that Tito has been promised Soviet support for the Yugoslav *claim* to the disputed territory. But there is absolutely no evidence, at least not at the moment of writing, that Russia approves of the *method* used to realize this claim. And this leads to the second question. If Russia remains silent, may it be assumed that her silence is an expression of approval of the American-British stand, very much in the same sense that her failure to support the Communist-led EAM during the ill conceived British intervention in Greece last year implied approval? Moreover, the Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, who can be counted upon not to adopt a policy contrary to the wishes of the Kremlin, in a statement of May 16 again affirmed Italy's claim to Trieste.

Whatever immediate decision is reached with regard to the matter of military control, and whatever territorial solution is ultimately accepted, the Yugoslav action in Venezia Giulia, just like the French and Polish actions in northwestern Italy and eastern Germany, has set a precedent which may well endanger the future peace of the world and which, as an Italian put it, is "the first example of postwar aggression." Actions such as these not only threaten the success of the work of the San Francisco Conference, but also belie the sincerity of the smaller nations now striving to preclude the dictatorship of the great powers in the United Nations Organization, which is feared, justly or not, by many among them. They also lend additional force to the argument that the maintenance of peace is the primary responsibility of the great powers.

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Double-Talk at San Francisco

THE FRANTIC NEGOTIATIONS of the past week here in quest of a formula for integration of the inter-American system into a world security organization, demonstrated above all the lack of adequate preparation for this conference by the State Department. As most observers anticipated, the question of regionalism versus regional isolationism developed into a serious and intricate problem. Yet when Mr. Stettinius came home triumphantly from Mexico City with the Act of Chapultepec in his pocket, both he and his advisers industriously shushed aides in Washington who had the temerity to suggest that it would be difficult to fit the Chapultepec structure into the principles laid down at Dumbarton Oaks and at Yalta.

As a consequence of this failure to recognize a cardinal fact of hemispheric life, the United States delegation landed this week in the midst of a problem that should have been well worked out and completely demarcated before the convention specialists left Washington in April. As this is written, it appears that even with this lack of preparation, the sound basic sense of the leaders of the American delegation is going to see the matter through satisfactorily. But events in this third week of conversations have amply demonstrated how inadequate vision can come close to wrecking the best laid plans of diplomats.

In the face of this near smash-up, it appears that the delegations here are producing a positive and constructive solution for the regional issues. It is to the credit of such strong men in the delegation as Commander Harold Stassen and Stettinius himself that they refused to permit themselves to be stampeded by the pressures of those State Department officials who were fearful of a hemispheric schism should the Latin American demand for autonomy not be appeased. And the pressure was intense, both from the nations which lie south of the Rio Grande and from such State Department advisers as Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller and his assistant, Avra Warren. Because of his own participation in the construction of the Act of Chapultepec, Chairman Tom Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was committed in part to collaboration with Rockefeller and Warren.

The articulation of the concept of self-defense as the criterion for activating regional or hemispheric defense associations is an ingenious device. It can hardly be termed a compromise, since a compromise usually connotes the yielding of certain basic principles or points. Yet this device still provides a means of maintaining the essential oneness of the 21 Americas in peaceful settlements while not withdrawing strength from the projected World Security Council in which all hope for the prevention of war must now be placed.

And, facing up to the possibility of the failure of Security Council, it leaves room for the hemisphere to act as a unit should bad machinery or procrastination prevent world action against aggressors.

There seems reason to believe that such a formula can be readily defended in the United States Senate when, as unfortunately can be anticipated, the one-time isolationists wrap themselves in the folds of the Monroe Doctrine and attempt to wreck world collaboration on the rocks of hemispheric isolation. The formula is viewed here by such students of international law as John Foster Dulles and Leo Pasvolksy as the logical projection of the Monroe Doctrine—a projection implemented by the principle enunciated formally at Chapultepec, that an aggression against any one of the Americas is an aggression against them all. And the invoking of the principle of self-defense is a resort to a basic premise with which few men can quarrel, for self-defense is as fundamental a reaction in the family of nations as it is in the family of individuals.

The emergence of a formula, while admittedly imperfect, still was cheering this week in so far as it was workable, defensible and clearly not of a nature to weaken the Security Council. Its development was the more remarkable in view of the well marked but still hazardous pitfalls which opened on either side of the delegation as it felt its way forward.

One of the principal manipulators of the United States maneuvers described the dangers this way:

We recognized the misstep inherent in any measure that might cut in any fashion into the normal functioning and jurisdiction of the World Security Council. That would have opened the door for one, then two, then endless regional arrangements and might certainly have nullified eventually the powers of the Security Council. Yet, in avoiding this danger, we could not make any move that might have provided our Latin American friends with reason for believing that they had been led down the garden path at Mexico City, even though the final two sections of the Act of Chapultepec might eventually have to be merged into the superior structure of the world organization. We had to make our stand that we entered into that act in good faith and were not being carried away by the heady atmosphere of world structures. Finally, we had to make desperately certain that the European peoples, particularly Western Europe, should have no ground for an impression that the United States is providing mere lip-service to the ideal of world action to keep the peace and is retiring to a new and vicious variety of hemispheric isolation.

Since that was the problem, the formula that emerged seems constructive, especially when viewed in the light of its difficulties. Note should be taken also of the fact that the United States delegation managed to main-

THE KING IS DEAD

"Le Roi est mort, vive le Roi!" the French courtiers used to cry when the pox finally had the better of the king. *"Hitler est mort, vive le Fascisme"* is a possible variation for the next few years to come, and we had better get this straight in our minds lest we find ourselves as painfully surprised as the keeper who went to sleep with his head in the lion's mouth. Fascism can't be defeated on the battlefield alone; it has to be defeated inside people's brains, hearts and glands; for it is merely a new word for a very old state of mind. Wherever there is talk of niggers, sheenies and kikes, wherever there is snooping, official or private, into citizens' amorous habits and political creed; wherever a demand for better wages is called the Red Menace and a legal strike is smashed with lead pipes and shot-guns—wherever these things happen, fascism is there, straight under your nose, you don't need to go to the pictures and look at the technicolor Gestapo to find it. —From Arthur Koestler's *The Yogi and the Commissar*, to be published on May 29 by Macmillan.

tain its unanimity in working toward the suggested solution—once Stassen pounded home his concept of a closely knit world. The American delegation was deeply concerned and gravely worried about the issue, so much so that on their first try with a formula, they imposed on each other a pledge of silence until a trial could be made of its impact on the other Big Five nations.

That concern was a healthy sign. At any point at which the delegates grow seriously worried about the possibility of a failure, the stalemates somehow begin to resolve. The air here often becomes hazy with words. But even this haze is unable to hide from the delegates that they dare not leave San Francisco without erecting a workable framework for peace-keeping.

It would be a good thing if that fear of failure could be translated positively into this conference's work toward creation of a trusteeship plan to supplant the mandate system of the League of Nations.

Double-talk has been the rule here whenever the trusteeship question arises. Lord Cranborne, despite his good record of following Anthony Eden in resigning from the Chamberlain government in the terrible days of appeasement, has made it amply clear that he has not come to San Francisco to modify in any respect the British concepts of colonialism. The questions of India, of Palestine, of the Dutch East Indies and the French Indo-China holdings, of Korea, bounce up here constantly—to the patent annoyance of Cranborne and, at times, to the annoyance of American delegates. The answers have been pat, but still double-talk. And even the impeccable Anthony Eden, in his only joust with the press, didn't do so well when asked why, since the arrest of 16 Polish political leaders had concerned Great Britain and injured Anglo-Russian amity, the

arrest of hundreds of Indian leaders throughout the war might not also have had an injurious effect on the unity of the United Nations.

The only straight facing up to the problem here has been by the Russians. They have not hedged around the conference table. Commissar Molotov sounded the keynote when, in his address before the plenary session, he stated that India would some day take her place among the independent nations of the world.

It was with similar bluntness that Andrakai Sobolev put the Soviet demand for an independence goal before the trusteeship talks of the Big Five. And with the same disdain for raised eyebrows, it was put again on Monday (May 14) before Peter Fraser's subcommittee by the Soviet adviser, A. A. Rostchin. It made Cranborne, on that occasion, stir in his chair and precipitated his later statement, in camera, that independence as a universal goal is not practicable in all areas now and in some areas may never be.

Regardless of whatever logic may obtain in Cranborne's unpublished remarks, it seems certain that Asia knows what Russia is talking about. There are many here who feel that if, as we are told, the world into which we are heading will see the gradual emergence of Asia into the industrial era with great power, it might be well for such nations as the United States to take part with Russia in recognizing in unvarnished language the universal aspiration of mankind toward independence. This is hardly done in the British statement of trusteeship purposes, which at this writing seems likely to be accepted by the United States delegation. Independence means many things to many peoples, but it undoubtedly does not mean the idea expressed by Cranborne's proposal that the United Nations pledge "the development of self-government in forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of each territory."

The most amazing example of the double approach to this problem came on the Monday which preceded by two days the beginning of the fourth week of this meeting of nations. The chiefs of delegation for almost three weeks had been displaying intricate footwork in avoiding discussion of such questions as Palestine, the Dutch East Indies and Korea on the contention that the issues are beyond the purview of the meaning of states. Yet on that Monday the important subcommittee on the trusteeship system permitted itself to be harangued for half an hour by D. L. Smit, former secretary of Native Affairs for the Union of South Africa. His subject was: the aspirations of the Union of South Africa formally to annex Southwest Africa, now held in a Class "C" mandate, as soon as opportunity is afforded.

There is not only double-talk on the subject of trusteeships: There is a double standard of subject matter for committee consideration.

San Francisco

THOMAS F. REYNOLDS

THE FAR EAST

From War to Peace

The International Chess Game

WAR AND POLITICS are like a chess game which goes on in unending, alternating phases. At the end of a military phase a number of the pawns—on both the winning and losing sides—are raised in rank, by virtue of the squares on which they stand, to the value of knights, bishops and even queens. At the same time some of the pieces of high rank are limited in their moves and degraded in their status to the value of pawns. The game then goes on, in its political phase. It is easy to see why, in the political phase, there are always those who would like to see a return to the military phase, hoping that in the general change of status and values their interests would be advanced.

This chess-game quality of war and politics is even more conspicuous in Asia, the ancient home of chess, than it is on the checkerboard of Europe. There are more pawns in Asia whose value may suddenly be enhanced. In Europe, the eclipse of Germany as a great power makes necessary an adjustment, and obviously a difficult adjustment, between the power of Britain, backed strongly but somewhat vaguely by America, to reach out into the continent from the west, and the power of Soviet Russia to reach out over the continent from the east. Between the two, however, there is no China; no country vast in area with a great economic potential as yet undeveloped and a great political potential as yet not channeled in a permanent system. Nor does the shattering of the Nazi doctrine of subject peoples confront us in Europe, as it does in Asia, with any problem quite so uncomfortable as the existence of a United Nations doctrine of subject colonial peoples.

Above all, there is an issue which has already been virtually decided in Europe, but has been dealt with in Asia only by America, and by America only partially. This issue, variously described as the question of the "breathing-space" or "cooling-off period," touches the innermost nature of politics. One way of describing Russia's policy in Poland is to say that it has forced all Europe to shift toward a line of no cooling-off period; no pause to rearrange the pieces on the chessboard. Changes take place in the values of the pieces, but even while the values are changing, the game goes right on.

The declared American policy, earlier in the war, of deferring political issues to the end of the conflict, was aimed at interposing a cooling-off period between the end of the military phase and the beginning of the political phase. This policy failed in Europe; which

makes it all the more important to note that in the restricted case of the Philippines, and nowhere else, the American policy has been akin to that of Russia in Poland and in Europe generally. In the Philippines there has been no cooling-off period. There has been no hiatus between the military phase of evicting the Japanese and the political phase of reinstating the Philippine government; the transition has been consecutive. Instead of a forced pause to predetermine the order of dealing with problems, General MacArthur and President Osmena have accepted the historical challenge of dealing with problems as they come up.

By so doing, they have set a precedent which may affect all Asia. On the other hand, our policy toward Korea is clearly aimed at imposing a cooling-off period. Are we eventually going to make one of these precedents the American precedent, rejecting the other, or are we going to try to follow both at once, in spite of the fact that they contradict each other? There is no more far-reaching decision in our foreign policy as a whole. The Philippines and Korea are not the most important countries in Asia, but all Asia will be affected by the choice of policy which they indicate. In China, the Chungking policy is unmistakably keyed to the securing of a cooling-off period; the Yenan policy is just as unmistakably one of no cooling-off. The colonial policies of Britain, France and Holland all require the imposition of a cooling-off period.

If there is to be conflict over policy-making in Asia—and there will be—it will be over this issue. A cooling-off period inevitably allows power to harden in the hands of those who already have power. It is therefore favored by those governments, and those groups within nations, which would like to salvage and conserve old forms of power, and opposed by those who demand more power than they now have, or who would like to establish new forms of power.

In the working out of these contradictions, the wide variation in unity between governments and peoples will be an important modifying factor. There is a good working definition of unity which is common to America and Russia, in spite of the differences between the two countries: in neither country do the people wish to change the form of government. There appears to be a similar unity in Outer Mongolia. In the Philippines the prestige of the government is high, and the transition from the leadership of President Quezón to that of

President Osmena has been remarkably smooth. There is, nevertheless, unmistakable pressure for wider representation of the people in the government.

In China there is a mounting demand for change in the form of government. The basic demand is for the right to elect representatives, doing away with the present system under which one party claims a monopoly of the right of appointment. In Thailand, the only other free country in Asia, there will be a demand at the end of the war for the purging of the collaborationists who turned the country over to Japan. The issue of a cooling-off period in Thailand will be of international significance, because the suggestion, in some quarters, of a tutelage to be imposed on this country reflects an intention to limit and control the area of change in Asia, thus buffering the area of colonial control and supporting the policy of a cooling-off period in colonial politics. In Korea, freedom has been promised "in due course"; which presages conflict between Korean pressure for the free formation of a free government and the Anglo-American-Chinese intention, under the Cairo Declaration, to impose a cooling-off period. Russia is not a party to this declaration; but Russia's allies may succeed in imposing on Korea what Russia prevented in Poland.

It is in the colonial possessions, however, that the issue is most acute. Here government is something imposed by aliens, disliked with varying degrees of intensity, and is hindered in its operation by nationalist movements whose effectiveness of organization and of action also varies widely. The problem is complicated by the fact that while the present governments of Britain, France and Holland are firm in their intentions, we do not yet know how far the voters in the home countries will go in giving their postwar governments a mandate to restore the old colonial system.

One thing at least is clear. In shaping their postwar policies both toward their own colonies and toward the free countries of Asia, Britain, France and Holland will not be able to rely on the prestige which was the kingpin of the old colonial system. Prestige had as many forms as it had uses. The Gibraltar-like aura of invincibility and permanence associated with names like Singapore and Hong Kong was an invaluable form of prestige. The ability of colonial governments to crush rebellions, to imprison "agitators," and at the same time to describe as "loyalty" the passive submission of the majority of their subjects, was another form of prestige. Still another was the ability to point to public-health programs, dams and irrigation projects and other good works. The sum total of prestige was a baffling impression, in the minds of free men far away from Asia, that "the natives" would never be able to throw off colonial rule; that in some ways they were "better off" under colonial administration; that perhaps a lot of them did prefer substitutes for freedom to the real article.

All that has gone. Hong Kong and Singapore did not merely fall; they collapsed. The French administration

of Indo-China caved in. The fact that Dutch power in the Netherlands Indies was a police power but not a true military power was underscored. Holland's power depended on her allies; when Britain and America could not assemble enough strength in the Java Sea, Indonesia was overrun. Nor did the Japanese meet determined—let alone effective—resistance in a single colonial territory. The subject peoples let their rulers get what was coming to them, and it was revealed that the "loyalty" of docile subjects in the past had had more to do with a fear of being unable to revolt successfully than with any desire to perpetuate the colonial regime.

Here is where we come in. We had, in the Philippines—and we alone had it—something politically much more important than "loyal natives" fighting under American officers. We had Filipinos and Americans fighting side by side, for different countries but for the same loyalties. We had, in our period of defeat and suspended government, guerrillas who were both a military arm and a political movement. We had, when we came back, a welcome both as deliverers *from* the Japanese and deliverers *of* the Filipinos. We are having, *from the Filipinos*, a demand for closer association, rather than clearer dissociation, which may prove actually embarrassing to certain aspects of our policy.

Why is the attitude of Filipinos toward Americans different from the attitude of colonial peoples toward their rulers? Not because our Philippine policy was any starry-eyed dream of altruism. It was, as a matter of fact, seamed with those activities of special interests and pressure groups which are characteristic of the pattern of all American activity. Nevertheless the outcome, whether we take credit for it or merely recognize the consequences of it, was that the Americans planned and set in motion the process of Philippine emancipation, instead of yielding, stage by stage, to Filipino demands or Filipino recalcitrance under alien government. Out of a drive that was American as well as Filipino, came the policy of freedom on an agreed and specific date, planned in advance, which sets the American relationship to the Philippines apart from all colonial policies which reluctantly concede "self-government" or "dominion status" at some unspecified date and under vaguely worked conditions.

Undoubtedly the average American is not so conscious of the significance of the Philippine precedent as are the officials and civil servants of countries with colonial possessions, among whom the practice of looking askance at the Philippines has developed quite a literature of its own. This American unawareness is due to the fact that we have, on the whole, thought of the emancipation of the Philippines as a problem of American domestic, rather than external, politics. We shall realize the importance of the precedent only in proportion as the fall of Japan brings home to us problems both of the structure of power and of the play of politics in the Western Pacific and Asia.

What we have done in the Philippines is to show that colonial liberation can be moved forward at the instigation of the sovereign power, and that it can be made evolutionary instead of revolutionary. We have shown that as liberation works out in practice, the natural leaders of nationalist revolution tend to be conservative rather than revolutionary within the structure and politics of their own societies. We have done this, however, without drawing conclusions which apply to the colonial possessions of other countries. Here, on the contrary, we tend to be swayed by the special pleading of those who have an interest in pointing out the "soundness" of reasons for maintaining "trusteeship" and the "unsoundness" of "sentimental" arguments in favor of freedom.

Had it not been for the war, we should not have been caught in a squeeze play between our tradition of continuous evolutionary development in the particular case of the Philippines and our general predilection for conservative inaction in the rest of Asia and in Europe. Now we are caught, because through our Philippines policy we shall be involved in the clash of freedom and subjection in Asia.

There is already an important "freedom bloc" in Asia—the Philippines, China, Thailand, Korea, Outer Mongolia. These countries vary a great deal. Several of them are very close to the margin of colonial control, open or disguised. In the largest of all, China, the domestic question of liberal action versus conservative inaction is closely parallel to the confrontation of the colonial demand for action by the insistence of conservative governments on massive inaction. In both the colonial countries and the free countries of Asia the key question is whether America's policies as a whole will be geared to action or anchored to inaction.

Onto the stage, thus set, walks Russia. Countries which have long established democratic systems regard Russia as undemocratic. Countries under alien rule, and to a certain extent countries which, though free, are barred from democratic development by over-conservative parties in power, regard Russia as democratic. Which group is going to grow—the one which lifts up its eyes to Russia, or the one which looks down its nose at Russia? The question is important; and it is a question neither of Moscow guile nor Moscow gold, but of other people's politics, including our own.

Obviously, the sedate and serene spread of freedom and democracy cannot be accomplished by decree. This truth has long been proclaimed by the anti-Utopians and disbelievers in Santa Claus. It should be equally obvious, however, that the spread of freedom and democracy cannot be prevented by decree, either—a truth which less frequently makes front-page news.

The working problem of history in the making is how to provide channels and prevent bottlenecks. The policy of conservative inaction which goes no farther than insistence on a cooling-off period is a policy of providing for a bottleneck and hoping for a cork. Such a policy will not work. Evolution, frustrated, would only break out as revolution. We Americans had better keep clear of the bottleneck, or we shall find ourselves in the front rank of imperialism, saluting Colonel Blimp, while the Russians take command of the ranks of moderate, orderly, progressive liberalism.

With the prestige of colonialism gone, we need a policy which will place America's prestige on the side of change—change accepted in principle and planned in execution. We do not have such a policy yet.

OWEN LATTIMORE

The Chinese Giant Stirs

AS THE CENTER of war turns to the Far East it is time to realize that, despite the natural disillusionment which has set in about our Chinese ally and has brought us so far from the day when we looked at that nation through rose-colored glasses, one thing is still certain about China. The land may be torn by internal dissension, dominated by a reactionary clique and unable to pull its own weight in the last stages of the assault on Japan. It may at the moment be a political fiction that the Chinese Republic is one of the Big Four of the world. Nevertheless, despite the melancholy picture she now presents, China is somehow, some way, on the march. She is truly an awakening giant, sprawling, confused and uncertain, stumbling to her feet clumsily and then falling again, but her inherent vitality cannot permanently be kept down. Everything that is written, thought or done about China must keep this fact firmly in mind.

One of the many great difficulties in writing about contemporary China is that the political situation has a way of shifting so suddenly. When I left Chungking last November, significant changes were taking place. General Stilwell had been removed at the request of Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer had taken his place. Ambassador Gauss had resigned and General Hurley, who had come to China as President Roosevelt's personal emissary, had been substituted for him. The Chinese higher officials were being shifted about a bit, too. General Ho Ying-chin had at last been removed as War Minister, even though he stayed on as Chief of Staff, while H. H. Kung had faded into the background and T. V. Soong appeared to be emerging from it. What seemed perhaps the most significant of all was that an American military-observer group had been permitted by the Chungking government to take up its post in the Communist areas centered in Yen-an.

To an observer interested in the restoration of unity and the establishment of an effective democratic government in China these steps seemed on the whole hopeful. It is true that the brusque removal of General Stilwell was a cruel blow at a true friend of China and hinted ominously of American surrender to the most sinister elements in the Kuomintang regime. It was not generally recognized, but it is equally true, that the resignation of Ambassador Gauss, not a popular man nor a likable one, but one with a deep and realistic understanding of current Chinese politics, deprived the United States of a representative who had the force and the knowledge to face the devious maneuverings of the supple Chungking politicians. In addition, no one in China with any sense of realism thought that the shifting of Ho and Kung and Soong meant any thoroughgoing change in the leadership of the Kuomintang.

At the same time there was reason to hope. Despite his great and endearing virtues, General Stilwell was unfortunately so much like the Generalissimo in temperament that he did provide Chiang with the excuse that it was impossible for him, as the recognized leader of a state, to deal with a foreign soldier so stubborn and imperious. It was an excuse which he could—and did—use to explain any lack of proper coöperation with the Americans. When General Wedemeyer arrived to succeed Stilwell and made an excellent first impression on all who met him by revealing tact, forcefulness and an open mind, it was hoped that, with the Generalissimo deprived of his last excuse for non-coöperation, it might be possible to persuade him to bring about some of the military and political reforms necessary to make the Chinese an effective fighting and social force in the Far East.

While the shifts in the Chungking government were not of major importance, they did indicate a step in the direction of a more efficient and progressive regime. The official American observer group in Yenan, composed of extremely able military and State Department men, as well as all of the American newspapermen who were allowed by the Kuomintang to visit the Communist areas, were so clearly impressed by what they saw and by the desire shown to fight the Japanese and bring about a unified, progressive China that there was reason to believe that the reports brought back would have enough weight in Washington to cause the American government to use its influence to bring about a Chinese wartime coalition government.

Of course, there was the school of thought which held that, though China needed a more progressive and unified regime, it was not right for the United States to meddle in the internal politics of an ally. I found few Chinese liberals who saw any merit in this contention. For one thing, it is clear that our government and our business interests always have interfered in the politics of China. Not only did we, along with

the British and French, encourage Chiang Kai-shek to split with the Communists in 1927, but ever since we have played a major role in keeping the Kuomintang in power, not merely as a force to resist the Japanese—since our support was certainly just as strong when the Kuomintang was appeasing Japan and the Communists were trying to build a popular front against Tokyo—but as a political party that was safe and sane and respectable. For what we regarded as good business reasons we unquestionably did meddle in Chinese domestic politics. Why, said the Chinese liberals, couldn't we meddle again when it meant saving the lives of American soldiers by helping to make China a strong military force and by bringing about a unified country that could be a force for peace in the postwar world?

Another reason why it seemed last winter that there was cause for optimism about China was, oddly as it may seem right now, General Hurley. Even those who saw in his political past a warning about his ability to be genuinely sympathetic to progressive causes, were impressed by the way the new ambassador set about his job. In the American Embassy in China were several of the ablest young men to be found in any diplomatic service anywhere, and he seemed willing to learn from their keen knowledge of the country. He listened, with apparently open mind, to other Americans and Chinese of varying points of view and, determined to see for himself, he flew up to Yenan, where he was so impressed by what he saw and heard that he brought back to Chungking in his own plane the Communist leader, Chou En-lai, who was in great part responsible for saving the Generalissimo's life when he was kidnapped by the Young Marshal at Sian. With Chou, the most skillful of the Communist negotiators and the one most trusted by the Kuomintang, brought back for negotiations with what appeared to be the Ambassador's blessings, there was more justification than ever before for hoping that an agreement could be reached.

The reflection of President Roosevelt added to the hopefulness of the picture. No one who has not been in one of the Allied nations during the war can realize how deep and widespread was the respect and affection in which the President was held by the democratic masses of the world or how great was his prestige among their leaders. This seemed particularly true in China. It was a regard and a prestige that not even the vacillations, the frequent weaknesses and the neglect of its opportunities which marked our foreign policy in the Far East could shake. Always there was the feeling among the Chinese liberals that, while the democratic cause in their land might seem to be ignored by the American government, there was the likelihood that our concern for popular democracy in the world would strongly reassert itself so long as Franklin Roosevelt was President.

This impression was reinforced when former Vice President Wallace visited China by way of Russia. Mr.

Wallace made an extremely favorable impression on those who saw him and it was the consensus of the American and Chinese newspapermen who covered the visits of both Wallace and Wendell Willkie that, with all due respect to Willkie, the Wallace visit was the more effective. As one reporter put it, Willkie made the headlines while Wallace made the friends, and this was said with no disparagement of Mr. Willkie's popularity. The Vice President indulged in no flattery of the country, though he made it clear that he liked and admired the people, but the success of his journey was based on two highly practical achievements that might surprise those who look upon Mr. Wallace as lacking in a sense of realism. The first is that he was responsible for getting the Kuomintang to consent to the sending of the United States observer group to Yen-an. The second is that he for the first time convinced the more violent members of the ruling-party clique that the United States would not fight the Chinese Communists and, if necessary, Russia to keep it in power. That the Chinese liberals did firmly believe that President Roosevelt was on their side and was about to do something important to aid the cause of Chinese unity was indicated by their conviction that the ruling group was hoping for the election of Governor Dewey.

With President Roosevelt reëlected, with Ambassador Hurley seemingly bent on doing his utmost to bring the Kuomintang and the Communists together, with the blockade against Yen-an somewhat relaxed and with the complicating factor of the unpleasant personal relations between Stilwell and Chiang removed, it seemed in November that the best chance for an agreement that would give China unified and effective national government had arrived. Yet, now, as Asia succeeds Europe as the central battlefield of the world, every sign indicates that the situation has again deteriorated. Although the Generalissimo has said that force would not be used to settle the Kuomintang-Communist issue and vague statements have been made both in Washington and Chungking about the chances for unity, and though a worthy but far from important Communist is a member of the Chinese delegation in San Francisco, the possibility of coalition seems farther away than ever.

Rather than becoming a valuable force for bringing about an agreement, Ambassador Hurley appears to have become a complete advocate of the Kuomintang point of view and thus one of the barriers to such an accord. Already he has been quoted as accepting the Chungking contention that the Communists must place their armed forces—armed, it should be said, without any aid from Washington or Chungking or Moscow, but with weapons seized from the Japanese—under Chiang's control. It is now accepted that we are to do nothing about aiding the Communist armies, even though they are holding down a great proportion of the enemy troops in China and have saved many a

young American flier forced down in territory dominated by their guerrillas. Of equal seriousness is the fact that the excellent and China-wise diplomatic staff that had been assembled under Ambassador Gauss has been broken up, with several of its ablest members withdrawn from the country they know so well. And in Washington the State Department is filled with first-rank officials whose special field is Japan and who show a strange propensity for admiring what they regard as the Better Elements of that country, and none of equal official standing whose speciality is China.

There were four things upon which all the American visitors to Yen-an during the summer and fall of 1944 seemed to agree, whatever their political points of view or whether or not they had any particular political leanings—and even a Pegler could hardly accuse most of them of undue sympathy for communism. Unanimously they reported (1) that, for all the recent Kuomintang claims to the contrary, the Chinese Communists were effectively fighting the Japanese invaders despite the fact that they were receiving no help from the outside; (2) that these so-called Communists were concerned, not with collectivizing China, but with building a progressive, democratic, non-feudal, unified nation; (3) that they received no aid from and were not subservient to the Soviet Union, although they had a deep admiration for its accomplishments; and (4) that they were anxious to be friends with the United States.

It is unquestionably true that the Chinese Communists suffer in American eyes through the name of their party. Since it happens that their current aims and tendencies are in the direction of agrarian democracy rather than collectivization, why, it is naturally asked, do they not change their name to something more in keeping with their purpose and less upsetting to Americans? The reasons seem to be several. For one thing, they are proud of their history and their achievement and do not want to go back on either of them. For another, they do not attempt to deny that while their experience has taught them that the path for China is in the direction of liberal democracy, their leaders still believe that eventually, at some distant date, the process of evolution will bring China and the rest of the world to communism. Finally, they are convinced that to change the party name at this late date would be a cowardly surrender in the face of foreign hysteria.

Whatever the handicaps of the party name, they have little to do with the apparent determination of the United States to back the Kuomintang just when it appeared that we were about to exert our influence on behalf of a coalition government. In great part this seems to be based on the curious political inferiority complex from which we invariably suffer when the Soviet Union is mentioned. Whenever a progressive, vigorous, dynamic group begins to emerge in any land, our immediate inclination is to say that of course it is obviously in the hands of Moscow and that we will

accept the more moribund group as being on our side. Somehow we are unwilling to recognize that, thanks in great part to the name of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the masses of Europe and Asia still think of the United States as being on the side of democracy and that the vigorous new progressive groups expect us to be their friends rather than hostile to them. It is fine that we should have respect for the achievements of the Soviet Union, but it is going a bit too far when we surrender our democratic status by default and virtually thrust the brave causes of the world into the arms of Moscow.

This propensity of ours is not only the result of spiritual defeatism. In great part it comes from a conviction that we are being practical. Our businessmen are convinced that they are being wise about saving their investments and going on to greater ones when they resist what they look upon as violent Chinese radicalism. Even the most conservative among them do not expect the return of the treaty-port days, extra-territoriality and the glorified status of the old China Hand. They know that even the Kuomintang, which is the party of their friends, does not plan to restore their old privileges and is determined to see that the proud Occidental is kept from his former position of racial domination. It nevertheless is their conviction that something of the spirit of the good old days will prevail and keep them essentially in their place, and therefore they are going to hold out against even the modicum of progress that might save them from the horror an uprising of desperation in Asia would cause.

The one compromise they make is that they are willing to grant that possibly some new blood could be injected into the feudal group dominating China through the American-trained Chinese businessman, who has been losing influence with the increase of anti-foreignism. Another middle-of-the-road hope is that either China's liberal independents or the progressives in the Kuomintang may be able to arrange a taking over of administration which would establish a modern but safe government without any compromise with the Communists. It is true that there are worthy and conscientious men in the ranks of business, in the independent political groups and among the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, but I gravely doubt that there are enough of them or that they have the force and ability necessary for the tremendous task of giving China an effective progressive government, unless they are backed by the popular skill and organizing talent of Communist leadership. It is certainly a question, for example, whether Dr. Sun Fo, the best known and most eloquent of the liberals, has the strength necessary to assume such a tremendous task, and the man who seems to me the ablest of the lot, Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to London, was unfortunately long ago relegated to the background, with little chance for a comeback.

It is frequently pointed out by those hostile to Yen-an that Chiang could no more accept such a regime than Lincoln could have accepted the Confederacy, and that the least the Communists could do to show good faith would be to turn their armies over to Chungking control. Such contentions ignore the facts of recent Chinese history. The Generalissimo had already accepted Yen-an when he entered into a popular front with the Communists to fight Japan, an agreement which temporarily brought about unity against the aggressor and the spirit of a people's resistance to the invader which made 1938, despite the fall of Hankow and Canton, the most encouraging year in recent Chinese annals. Such episodes as the attack on the Communist-led New Fourth Army—an attack which Owen Lattimore, who, I think, is still a great admirer of Chiang Kai-shek, states flatly must be blamed on the Kuomintang—ended that unity.

The rising shadow of Russia meanwhile grows increasingly ominous. It is true the Soviet Union withdrew from Sinkiang, has given no aid to the Chinese Communists and has behaved meticulously toward the extremely suspicious government in Chungking. But victorious Russia is feeling her strength these days, and if the Russians enter the war against Japan and find China still rent with political dissension, it would be natural for them to give direct support to the Yen-an regime, whose troops they will come in contact with as soon as they invade Japanese-held North China. Since we refuse to give armed support to the Chinese Communists, there will arise the dangerous situation of the Russians and the Eighth Route Army fighting side by side in the north, while America again finds herself supporting a reactionary regime nearby. The situation would be additionally uncomfortable if our troops made their long-talked-of China-coast invasion north of Shanghai, where we would immediately come into contact with Chinese guerrillas whom we have refused to aid. A coalition government is the only answer to these explosive potentialities.

There is a final reason why a unified China is needed at once. As the one Asiatic country that has maintained its independence against both East and West, it is in position to exert great moral authority in the Orient. Yet the fact remains that at the moment its prestige throughout the East, even in India, is low and its people unpopular. That unpopularity has many economic and other causes, but if the nation were unified under a progressive democratic government, this unpopularity and suspicion could be dissipated, China's spiritual prestige would be enormous and it would no longer be a fiction that she was one of the Big Four. The spirit of China that has kept her alive and vital after years of war and misrule deserves a government worthy of it. One would like to think that American policy was helping to bring about a condition so important to the future of the world. RICHARD WATTS JR.

The War in the Pacific

THE QUESTION, as FDR used to say to his press conferences, is "iffy." The main "if" in the war against Japan is the attitude of the Soviet Union. If the Russians throw their armies on the Manchurian frontier and their supply convoys in behind the Chinese Communists, the Asiatic mainland will not be a Japanese base but a combat area and the war can be ended with the invasion of the metropolitan islands. If they do not, the war with Japan is likely to end like the German, with the enemy driven from their homeland but still in possession of their conquests.

It makes a not inconsiderable difference in the strategy and even in the tactics of the assault on the heart of the empire. In one case the unavoidable invasion of the home islands is an attack on the enemy's central citadel which no relief can reach. Reserves are unnecessary and maneuvers can be undertaken with reference only to their local effects. In the other case that same attack will be delivered against an outwork. It is necessary to consider what forces the enemy has in his rear base and what industries; and above all, how the communications between this rear base and the forward fighting areas may be interrupted.

Without the concordance of the Russians, one of the most important items on the military agenda would be the establishment of a blockade of Japan—an air-tight, all-round blockade, not of the type which prevents major military and commercial movements, but of that which inhibits minor contacts. A specific Japanese defensive device is working small; when our submarines began to cut seriously into their merchant fleet, they replied with a program of building hundreds of wooden sampans, and the effort has been to construct replacement warships smaller but more numerous than those replaced.

Without such a blockade we should have the Japs on the mainland crossing Tsushima Strait in anything that would float and the campaign of Honshu might turn into a kind of enlarged Guadalcanal. The process is no doubt expensive to the enemy. As at Guadalcanal, the air force could get rid of a lot of reinforcements before they reached land. But any sensible plan for dealing with an army which still contains something like four million well trained and well equipped men must look forward to hitting part of that force with all of ours—a campaign of maneuver rather than of siege. This is particularly true in a war with the Japanese, who have shown themselves such tenacious and damaging fighters when defending fixed positions and such thoroughly incompetent tacticians in a war of movement.

There are a good many who think we should set up the close blockade in any case, and that it would automatically eliminate the hard fighting on Honshu. In

most cases this grows out of the same kind of wishful thinking that called for the "easy" victory through air power without the invasion of the European continent back in 1942 and 1943. There is rather more justification for the blockade idea than there was for that of winning the war through bombing. Blockade is a method of proved military efficacy and one to which Japan is peculiarly vulnerable. She lacks many of the essential materials of heavy war industry—iron and oil for example—and the fact that she has been able to keep going as well as she has is as much due to the support of the basic industries of Manchuria as to Japanese ingenuity in the use of ersatz materials, especially wood. A close blockade will sooner or later bring her wheels to a halt.

But there would still remain considerable stockpiles, both of raw materials and finished goods. As long ago as early 1944, while the campaign for the Marshalls was still under way, the Japanese government announced that food imports from the stolen empire would be temporarily discontinued to permit the stockpiling of war materials. One of the surprises of the actions against besieged Japanese positions everywhere has been the apparently inexhaustible quantities of munitions with which the defenders are supplied. In fact it is safe to say that no nation has ever been forced into surrender by the failure of its heavy industry, however much this may help. Other factors supervene first, as in the recent case of Germany and in that of the Southern Confederacy.

The food situation is something else again and it is quite possible that a real blockade would produce spectacular results. We have heard about the Japanese capacity to live on fish and a handful of rice till the subject has become a cliché. The fact is that at the time of Pearl Harbor the average Japanese was already down to a bare subsistence diet and since that time several things have happened to lower the level still further. The best estimate is that their fishing fleet has been cut about in half by the operations of our submarines, the employment of its craft on military duties and shortages of gasoline. Rice was already severely rationed before the present war and recently there have been indications of a real food crisis, as when the official radio urged survivors of the great fire raid on Tokyo to get out in the country and work on food production and two weeks later hymned the virtues of sawdust bread, with recipes for making it.

Yet even starvation by blockade, unless with the help of the bombers it can be carried much farther than it ever has in recorded history, is an indirect method. It produces apathy, inefficiency (a heavy rise in the Japanese factory-accident rate is reported through neu-

tral sources), lowered resistance to disease; it has not among the Japanese so far anywhere produced a disposition to surrender. In the Buna campaign they lost more men by hunger than by bullets, but there were very few prisoners, and in some of the by-passed islands they are reported to have eaten off all the grass but without any signs of giving up. It is possible that when the big industrialists and the military coterie around the Emperor themselves begin to get hungry they will be in a different mood, but down to the present the Japanese system of religio-political education has prevented any surrenders but those of individuals.

Besides, it is doubtful whether the people who are advocating blockade as a cure-all against Japan realize what a task it would be to set one up. The key to the situation lies in the Straits of Tsushima. With the Okinawa fields in our hands, shipping in those straits is already being raided; but they are narrow enough and have enough island cover to permit so much traffic to get through them that only an actual lodgment on the straits themselves would yield a truly effective blockade.

Whether such a lodgment were attempted on Tsushima Island or Saishu, or Kyushu or the facing promontory of Korea, it would be a military undertaking of the most serious character, quite equal to an assault on the shores of Honshu itself. All the points abutting on the strait lie in the center of a circle of bases for Jap planes and small craft and an expedition would be subject to unrelenting suicidal attacks from them. Such a landing may be attempted, for Admiral Nimitz is an extremely bold strategist, but the difficulties are so serious, the relative gain in rendering complete the present partial blockade is so small, that the direct attack on the home islands appears the preferable route.

The other "if" in the situation is concerned with the results of that attack on the home islands. The Japanese navy has been effectively destroyed; it no longer exists as a force capable of conducting major operations or interrupting those of an enemy. Their air forces have been on the downgrade in quality since the Solomons campaign, when it became clear that their pilot-training program was a failure. Lately those forces have begun to decline quantitatively as well. Their army has had cruel losses, but those losses have been at least numerically made good and their incidence has not been such as to impair the general structure—as the German army was damaged by the fighting in Russia, where the losses were distributed through practically all formations. Wherever encountered, the Japanese troops have so consistently fought to the end that the over-all proportion of prisoners is something less than one in ten on those islands where there has been no means of escape and the choice has been between death and a prison camp.

The question is whether we face the rather appalling necessity of killing 3,600,000 armed men to put an

end to the war. Any strategy that will produce the surrender rather than the extermination of a substantial number of these men is desirable—not for humanitarian reasons, but because the extermination process involves heavy casualties to us. At Tarawa our casualties were approximately 3,000, to 5,000 Japs—a proportion which has been fairly constant where the fighting was severe. It is true that the large majority of our losses were in wounded, of whom three-quarters can be made almost as good as new. But the three-to-five yardstick placed alongside 3,600,000 required Japanese deaths gives a figure so high that planning to avoid it is something more than desirable. Indeed, the theory on which the Japs are conducting their war is that they can make this casualty rate stand up throughout and that we can't take it.

Now obviously, with or without Russian help, the only place where a lay-down-your-arms order is to be won is on the main island of Japan, Honshu. Whether it should be obtained by maintaining and then capturing the Emperor, or by demolishing him, is purely a question of grand tactics. The fanatics of empire around him, racists to a degree beyond Hitler's wildest imaginings, are in either case perfectly capable of abandoning the ancient homeland to continue the struggle from the Asiatic continent and the islands they still hold. Or at least we assume that they are. No military man dare make plans on the assumption that an enemy who has shown no sign of giving up the struggle under other circumstances will quit when he sees his neighbor's rooftop afire. If the invasion of Honshu is not decisive, then we shall have to contemplate a campaign in China—with or without Russian help.

There is a good deal of backing for the idea that such a campaign should be undertaken in any case, partly as a question of how best to isolate Honshu and reach its heart. Since early in 1942 at least, the Japs have made energetic efforts to set up an inland system of communications from the territories they still hold in the south to the ports of the Yellow Sea. Some of the effects of the close blockade would be obtained if an expedition could be landed on the Chinese coast to thrust inland across that communication line. Moreover, such an expedition would provide a much needed moral stimulus to our Chinese allies, who have fought longer and under more discouraging circumstances than any other of the United Nations. The consideration is one of a kind that must often be allowed to overrule those of pure strategy.

But the idea that such a landing and such a campaign would free thousands of Chinese troops, to make our task an easier one, is a delusion. There is no Chinese army in the sense that the Japs or Western powers have armies; there are only a number of willing and badly equipped guerrillas. This is not an invidious reflection on the capabilities of the Chinese

soldiers nor on the intelligence and courage of their officers, but a statement of fact. Chinese troops under Stilwell's command have been at least a match for the enemy formations they encountered and sometimes more. The fact that they were under Stilwell's command is the key.

These troops were flown out over the Hump in the early days of the war and they were at that time considered some of the best formations in Chiang Kai-shek's army. Before Vinegar Joe could send them into action, however, he had to equip them completely and give them two years of training. They had no artillery, no transport, no engineers, no mortars, flame-throwers or tanks, no air force of their own. Neither have the armies in China, and few Chinese have ever seen

any instrument of war more complex than a rifle save in the hands of their enemies. China has no facilities for making these things, and not only must they be supplied to a Chinese army, but every man from the lowest to the highest must be taught to use them.

The problem is not dissimilar to that faced by our own army in building itself up from the bottom after the passage of the Draft Act of 1940—save that we had a nucleus of experience and our men had a long background of mechanical training. It was a good two years after 1940 before that army was able to take effective action; and we can at least hope that we shall not have to wait two years from the landing on the Chinese mainland till some army encounters the Japanese in the field on even terms. FLETCHER PRATT

The Russian Bear Looks East

SOVIET INTEREST in the Far East stems from the fact that the USSR is the only one of the Big Three which lives there. We are fighting the Pacific war from island bases thousands of miles from our shores. The British are fighting from India. The Soviet Union borders Japanese-held territories for thousands of miles. One of the great Nipponese naval bases is located on the northernmost of the Kurile Islands, just south of the Soviet peninsula of Kamchatka. These islands effectively block free access to the Pacific both from the mouth of the Amur and from the Soviet Klondike along the Sea of Okhotsk.

Russia shares the island of Sakhalin with Japan, and the Nipponese on the relatively valueless southern half look with envy upon the wealth of the northern portion in coal and oil. Their greed is the greater since Moscow compelled them to abandon their concessions there a year ago.

To the south the only year-round Soviet port on the Pacific, Vladivostok, has access to the open sea—and to American trade—only through the main islands of Japan. On the landward side, it is only a hop, skip and a jump from Korea and Manchuria.

For 2,000 miles north and west of Vladivostok, the Soviet Union borders Manchuria. As in Canada, climate has compelled the settlers of the Soviet Far East to cling to their southern frontier. Almost all of the six million people of this area live within fifty, or at most a hundred, miles of the border—between the Amur River, which is the frontier, and the Trans-Siberian railroad, which was built as close to the Amur as geography permitted. Moreover, this is the *only* railroad. The rail-line to the north shown on most maps has not been completed, according to the best information available.

It should be pointed out that there is only one city in the Far East—Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur—which is

as much as an hour's flying time from the border. The others are so close that no warning system could possibly prevent a Pearl Harbor attack, although the price the Japanese would have to pay is another story.

All these factors help determine Soviet policy in the Far East, both in the long run and in its immediate application at any moment. What has that policy been? It has been consistently pro-Chinese, and, by that very fact, anti-Japanese. In its earliest years, the USSR abrogated all special rights and privileges in China and other semi-colonial countries. This was done regardless of the nature of the government in power, for the Chinese government with which Moscow first established relations in 1924 was still the reactionary Peking regime.

This unique anti-imperialist policy won the support of Chinese nationalists of all hues. As a result, from 1925 to 1927 there was close Sino-Soviet coöperation, at the initiative of Sun Yat-sen. When, after Sun's death, Chiang Kai-shek broke the united front then existing with the Chinese Communists, he also found it necessary to break with Moscow. This was because Sun had invited Soviet political and military advisers into the country, as Chiang later did with Americans, and internal unity was therefore inextricably bound up with the virtual Soviet alliance.

After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, China reestablished relations with the USSR, and the Soviets then sent aid to China. Today China is receiving more aid from the United States than the Soviet Union was ever able to send. Britain has moved fleet units into action against the Japanese. On land, she is engaging them in Burma on a large scale. France has asked to be included in the Asiatic campaign. Stalin flatly called Japan an aggressor last November, and, in his recent May Day Order, called the attention of the Soviet people to the fact that Japan was Germany's

sole remaining ally. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has freed its hands by denouncing the Neutrality Pact with Japan. Under the circumstances, it can in no way harm Allied unity to recall a somewhat different period of history. On January 21, 1941, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek wrote an article in *Liberty* magazine. If China should lose, she held, it would be because she

was strangled to death by an economic noose fashioned by Japan out of British appeasement, American profiteering and French fear. . . . Eighty percent of Japan's war supplies came from America—and 95 percent of the aviation gasoline which was used by Japan in her ruthless bombing was American. . . . Intellectual honesty constrains me to point out that throughout the first three years of resistance, Soviet Russia extended to China, for the actual purchase of war materials and other necessities, credits several times larger than the credits given by either Great Britain or America. Both these countries, indeed, circumscribed their advances with conditions which prevented even one cent of the money [from] being used for badly needed munitions, equipment or war materials of any kind. Furthermore, at the meetings of the League of Nations, it was Russia who took an uncompromising stand in support of China's appeal that active measures should be adopted to brand Japan as the aggressor. Russia acted similarly during the Brussels Conference. On both occasions Britain, France and other member nations compromised their consciences. When Japan protested through the Ambassador at Moscow that the aid extended was a breach of neutrality, Russia did not wilt, or surrender, or compromise, but continued to send supplies of arms to China. It will doubtless be said that Russia has been aiding China for selfish interests. In reply to this I may point out that Russian help has been unconditional. . . .

To this two facts need to be added. First, Soviet support for the Chinese cause at Geneva, even before Japan's attack in 1937, was gratefully acknowledged by the Chinese delegates. Yet this was at the time when the Kuomintang government was still engaging in its annual extermination campaigns against the Chinese Communists. Second, it is unanimously agreed that Soviet aid hitherto has gone only to Chiang, and never to the Communists. (Harrison Forman states in *Report from Red China* that one small shipment did go to the Eighth Route Army, *through* Chungking, during the honeymoon period of the Chinese United Front.)

The Soviet Union continued to forward aid after Germany's attack on Russia. For example, on August 6, 1941, during the life-and-death battle at Smolensk, the *New York Times* reported from Chungking that Soviet pilots, planes, artillery, gasoline and munitions were en route to China. However, at the end of October Moscow informed the Chinese that it would be unable to continue shipments. Nevertheless, they were resumed the following year. When finally broken off, Russia was over the hump in the war with Germany. It is clear that the cessation of supplies was not due to Moscow's inability to provide them.

Obviously, there has been a change in the *application* of Soviet policy in the Far East. The word "application" is emphasized because there is no reason to believe that the policy itself has changed. Madame Chiang's caustic comment was cited above in order to cast into sharpest relief a matter which is often overlooked. It is that there is the fullest justification for believing that Soviet policy in the Far East will continue to pursue the objectives sought in the past, because that policy has been so completely consistent—ininitely more consistent than that of China's other allies.

What are these long-term Soviet aims, written in a clear and unmistakable hand on the pages of Far Eastern history since 1917? In the phrase of an outstanding expert on Soviet relations in this area, *Moscow wants a strong and friendly China, a defeated and reformed Japan and a collective organization to keep the peace*. Until recently, Moscow believed that the unification of China in the war against Japan, plus American naval and air power and supplies from all the major Allies, would accomplish the first two objectives. Today, however, the Soviets are obviously of the opinion—and have said so in their press—that Chungking is not fighting the Japanese with a fraction of the strength at its disposal. They hold that its reactionary policies and refusal to reestablish unity of all anti-Japanese forces have reduced even its potential strength to a very low level. Finally, they agree with Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times*, and with other recent American eye-witness observers, that Chiang is hoarding the supplies he now gets from abroad for use in a civil war to crush the "New Democracy" of North China after his allies have taken care of the Japanese for him.

This is why the Soviets are not now supplying China. It is the key to any changes envisaged by Moscow in the means of attaining its long-term aims in the Pacific. What are the Allies to do, in the face of the fact that Japan is actually gaining ground on the Chinese mainland because of China's disunity? We could ignore China, as our navy seems to propose, and smash Japan by the joint strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. No doubt these powers could do that job, but in Moscow's view it would solve nothing. *A defeated Japan, no matter how badly beaten, would still be stronger than a disunited, stagnant China, because of her infinitely more modern economy, technical know-how (which one cannot dismantle and cart away), and experience in organization, military matters and a thousand other fields*. Therefore, so long as China remained weak, the United States and the USSR would have to sit on—and in—Japan, and no lasting change in the relationship of forces would have been brought about.

Russia therefore believes that China *must* be united, *must* become strong—for our sakes as well as her own.

What, then, about putting the Soviet armies in motion across Mongolia, making contact with the Chinese guerrilla areas, supplying them and jointly advancing on Manchuria and Japan from the west while we do the same from the east? In one form or another, with or without direct Russian belligerency, that may have to be done. But up to this moment any such move has been stymied by our attitude toward the Chinese guerrillas.

It is clear that with the memory of the Mihailovich affair in Yugoslavia still fresh, and the endless Polish wrangle still with us, it would be unthinkable for Stalin to launch unilateral aid to Communist-led Chinese forces while we aid Chungking only. The Soviets took no steps to recognize or materially aid Tito until Churchill first convinced himself that the Croatian Communist metal-worker headed the only forces in Yugoslavia really fighting the Germans. Likewise, Moscow cannot take important steps to aid the Eighth Route Army in China as long as our policy remains that recently expressed by Ambassador Hurley. He said that the position of the Chinese Communists is the same as that which would exist in the United States if all Republicans were armed and held parts of the country by force.

If we want active Soviet aid in the Far East—armed or otherwise—we must either compel Chiang toward a policy of unity, or make up our minds that he is a Mihailovich, and aid those Chinese, of all political convictions, who will really organize the country to fight Japan. Short of that, the Russians cannot aid China without endangering inter-Allied unity, something far more vital to the world than even the situation in China.

When changes in our policy do make possible more active Soviet participation in solving the Far Eastern situation, what forms will it take? In plain English, will Russia fight Japan? Soviet policy as described here would indicate no lack of hostility toward Japan. China's hoped-for strength and Japan's weakness-to-be will be purely relative for some years to come. This has already given the Russians the idea of regaining the naval base of Port Arthur and the port of Dairen for the same reasons that they have taken Königsberg and we have staked out a claim to Okinawa.

But there is another side to the medal. Asking Congress to declare war on Germany and Italy on December 9, 1941, President Roosevelt said:

We also know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan. . . . It is collaboration, actual collaboration, so well calculated that all the continents of the world, and all the oceans, are now considered by the Axis strategists as one gigantic battlefield. . . . For weeks Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan did not attack the United States, Japan would not share in dividing the spoils with Germany when peace came.

It is because the Big Three have always regarded this as one war, with Germany as the prime mover and by far the strongest enemy, that all energies were directed toward German destruction first. Toward that effort, the Russians have contributed five million soldier dead, not counting two or three times that number of civilians. We and the British together have lost 500,000 dead in *all* theatres of war. This is a ratio of one to ten.

We are not Nazis. To us the value of an American life equals that of a Russian—and a Russian is no lower in value than an American. Clearly, we are in no position to *ask* the Russians to make further sacrifices. *The choice is up to them.* If it is the saving of American lives which motivates us, as it should, we *have* the right to prod Chungking, or to decide to ignore it in favor of Chinese leaders who will fight. That will save American lives and, in the long run, Chinese lives. It will also free the hands of the Soviet Union to make the greatest contribution to victory in the Pacific which it feels it can afford in view of its losses in Europe.

As that victory is forged, territorial questions are coming to the fore. The Soviet attitude toward Manchuria, Korea, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, as well as toward the colonies and semi-colonies of southern Asia and the rest of the world, has been revealed at San Francisco in unmistakable terms. It is no accident that Moscow brought *no* proposals for trusteeship, but stated its original position through Molotov, as follows:

We must first of all see to it that dependent countries are enabled as soon as possible to take the path of national independence.

This should be promoted by a special organization of the United Nations which must act with a view to expediting the realization of the principles of equality and self-determination. The Soviet delegation will take an active part in the consideration of this problem in its entirety.

After Molotov's departure, his delegation brought forth amendments to the American plan which they prefaced with the following words:

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system should be to promote the political, economic and social advancement of the trust territories and their inhabitants and their progressive development toward self-government and self-determination, with active participation of the peoples of these territories having the aim to expedite the achievement by them of full national independence.

In short, Moscow proposes to apply to Asia those policies which, in the words of Henry Wallace, have resulted in "ethnic democracy" in the USSR, and which in their final development, brought the Ukraine and White Russia to San Francisco. The world could do worse.

WILLIAM MANDEL

The Japanese Mind

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE have been subjected to miseducation on a scale unparalleled in the modern world. The so-called "national mind" of Japan includes, along with its more rational elements, an ill assorted mixture of bogus history, mythological fantasy, primitive ethnocentrism, insular prejudice and fear, make-believe, non-rational emotionalism and fanatical exaggeration such as is hard to duplicate anywhere else in human history. The re-education of that mind must be accomplished before Japan can expect to gain for herself a place in a peaceful and mutually coöperative world. Fundamental to this task is the identification of at least the most important areas in which this reëducation must occur.

The psychological disarmament of Japan must deal first with her claims to racial uniqueness and superiority. If one motive has dominated the educational activity of modern Japan more than another, it has been the attempt to inculcate convictions of military invincibility by proclaiming the uniqueness of the Japanese people over all others. The theme of the superior *Nippon Seishin*—"the Japanese Spirit"—and the peerless *Yamato Damashii*—"the Yamato Soul"—has been harped on by every agency of propaganda and education until, if the Japanese military masters could have their way, the people as a whole would be made permanently incapable of free democratic association with the rest of the world. Even Japanese university professors, who supposedly have been touched with respect for scientific veracity, have attributed to their people "a hyper-consciousness peculiar to the Japanese alone" and a conviction that they "live and die in the belief that they are acting as only Japanese could act."

These unique qualities the Japanese people are supposed to have received as a mystical, supernatural inheritance from the divine ancestors. The most frequently emphasized are: an incomparable loyalty and patriotism, an innate capacity for high moral achievement, a unique bent for order and unity, an unrivaled power of assimilation and direction and an urge toward expansion and development. In the manifestation of these qualities the Japanese spirit will never endure restraint at the hands of other nations.

Much of this is recognizable as response to a state education which in the past seventy-five years has had to inspire a population of serfs with the convictions and confidence of the *samurai*. Some of it is an out-and-out inferiority complex seeking compensation in big talk. Some of it is primitive insularity preserved and fortified by geographical remoteness. Some of it has to be taken seriously.

To this category belongs that intense loyalty to emperor and fatherland which has been so conspicu-

ously manifested since the Pacific war began in Japanese refusal to surrender on the battlefield. We need not take refuge, as have some American writers, in "the mysteries of the inscrutable Oriental mind," nor again in the Japanese fantasy of a superior psychological inheritance. The situation has a rational explanation. Its causes are complex but intelligible. There is the influence of the feudal tradition—and back of that an old head-hunter practice—which took no prisoners in war. When a war captive was saved, it was tantamount to announcing that he had turned traitor. This tradition got into the Japanese mores and furnished tremendous capital to the militarists when, very early in the modern period, competition with the West led them to adopt universal military conscription. Out of this tradition has arisen the possibility of severe pressure on the families left at home through the manipulation of the fear of the disgrace of surrender.

Added to this is the effect of an almost morbid education for death—wherein Buddhist pessimism accentuates primitive impersonality—rather than training in intelligent living for the community. By holding out the assurance of enshrinement as a god in the great national sanctuary on Kudan Hill, extraordinary significance is given the immolation of the loyal soldier in battle. At this point there comes to focus the full force of the inculcation of racial and institutional uniqueness. A form of state superior to all others on earth, a nation never defeated in war, a people who have never accepted a foreign insult, a sacred soil never defiled by the footsteps of foreign enemies, every war a holy crusade and a god-given mission to spread the glory of Japan throughout the world—all this is constantly magnified as a challenge to glorious death.

Supplementing this is a long accumulation of bitterness and fear directed toward the white man. Refusal to surrender to the white man is one way of showing contempt for him. Again, the severity of Japanese military resistance is partly explicable as the delaying tactics of desperation. It is part of a plan to make the cost so terrible that America's purpose to carry through will weaken. Finally we have to bear in mind the limitations of Japan's experience in full-fledged modern war. All her ventures prior to the present struggle have been relatively small undertakings against weaker adversaries. What the Japanese soldier will do when confronted with the terrible reality of defeat on a vast scale remains to be seen. He may discover that his superior valor is after all the valor of ignorance.

The psychological disarmament of Japan must deal with the extraordinary glorification of war in the national educational system. In the Japanese scheme of values, war is the chief means of promoting national

fortune. No modern state, Germany not excepted, has gone to such pains to make her children war-minded.

Among all the various methods employed by the authorities for making the nation responsive to military direction the most astute is the incorporation within the military ideal of all the natural universalism of the human spirit. In accomplishing this, *Bushido*, or the Way of the Warrior, a code which was once the monopoly of a comparatively small group of professional swordsmen, is sanctified with a garb of righteousness and extended to the nation as a whole. The sordidness and cruelty of the feudal warrior are carefully expurgated from the records and "a traditional spirit of *Bushido*" is manufactured out of whole cloth and idealized as the realization of the highest human virtues. *Bushido* now becomes a way of life that inculcates the duty of noble sacrifice for sovereign and fatherland, of succor for the weak, of the suppression of aggression, of the avoidance of evil and the fostering of sincerity. *Bushido* is declared to be the Japanese racial spirit itself.

Camouflaged under the canopy of good will, Japanese wars are for the protection of the weak and extension of brotherly coöperation among men. Every call to arms when sanctified by an imperial decision is a holy crusade. This glorification of the goodness and infallibility of the Emperor and the corresponding degradation of the duty of subjects into blind obedience are the chief points at which Japanese militarists have falsified their national history and manipulated education and propaganda. For, as Basil Hall Chamberlain pointed out long ago, no people have been more cavalier in their treatment of their rulers than the Japanese. It is undoubtedly fear that has led the militarists to adopt such extravagant inventions concerning "emperor worship." The fact of the matter is that, if left to determine their own political future in the postwar world, the Japanese people may deal more drastically with the Tennessean than they would under foreign coercion.

All this is only part of an even more ominous situation in Japanese national psychology—subordination to a state which sets itself up as the source and final judge of all the goodness necessary to man. The inner sanctuary of personality has been invaded by a dehumanizing state education until the very standards of moral judgment themselves have been overturned. Conventionality or standardization in terms of officially expedient norms is the dominant characteristic of Japanese social psychology. Life has become conformity to a set of rules imposed from above.

The result is the sterilization of conscience and the destruction of the capacity to enter into imaginative sympathy with the experiences of other people. This is the primary explanation of the incongruous dualism that exists between professions of sincerity and deeds of deception in the Japanese. It is the point of view

from which we can best understand the appearance of a reputation for cruelty and indifference to suffering in a people who have such an innate capacity for esthetic sensitiveness and toleration. Human nature, remade to suit the needs of state absolutism and denuded of inner standards of judgment, cannot be humane until it gets government orders on how to be kind.

The conclusion to be drawn is grim but inescapable. The primary step to be taken in the spiritual renovation of Japan is the administration of a thoroughgoing military defeat. The terrible truth is that nothing will clear the air and overturn false gods and false ideals like the winds of disaster in war that are already beginning to blow strongly across Nippon.

Are there, then, no hopeful aspects whatever to the Japanese situation? Does the evidence discourage all expectation of the emergence of a basis for democratic self-direction soon enough to be of any use in postwar reconstruction? Is the prospect merely one of prolonged military occupation which places even education itself under martial law? There is one background consideration which gives a positive direction to the answers to some of these questions. In their manipulation of national sentiment, the Japanese military authorities have had to resort to the deception of their own people. They have feared the indignation and revulsion of the nation if once the brutal truth were known. Thereby Japanese militarism has indirectly proclaimed the capacity of the common people for participation in the higher qualities of universal human nature—rationality, sincerity, loyalty to freedom, and good will.

Regard for truth also compels us to recognize that there exists in the Japanese record, particularly in the period between the two world wars, a democratic protest against the official violation of personality. This can be deepened and appealed to. At that time a great Japanese scholar optimistically declared that his country had been growing democratic and was destined to become more and more like England. This was not said with a subtle deception of foreign countries in mind; it was said in the Japanese language for home consumption. Another man courageously challenged the authorities with the pronouncement that the state despotism which had ruled in Japan for so long had met its reward in the engendering of a sense of irresponsibility in the masses which left them impotent to attend spontaneously even to the things that most directly concerned their own personal lives. A great newspaper accused the government of making the nation cowardly and mean by tyrannizing over freedom of speech and the press. A young liberal attacked the bureaucrats for falsifying history and misrepresenting the function of the Emperor for military ends. A great lawyer, supported by the entire faculty of the Imperial University of Tokyo, defended the interpretation that the Emperor did not transcend the state.

An influential priest declared that a state which betrayed the ideas of justice and freedom and countermanded the dictates of love and humanity had no right to exist. When the struggle to protect parliamentarism against military usurpation reached its climax, the greatest of the metropolitan newspapers declared that the political parties must fight tyranny with the determination on the part of leaders to sacrifice life itself if necessary. These are only a few examples.

It is frequently contended in America that the end of the war will see the earlier Japanese liberalism, such as it was, so thoroughly liquidated as to preclude any hope that it can gain sufficient power to organize a successful democratic regime. This opinion is sometimes supported by the statements that most of the so-called liberals were already old men at the outbreak of the Pacific war and that liberalism offered no protest to the military domination of Asia. Both these assertions are contrary to fact. Anyone directly acquainted with the educational life of Japan knows that by the middle of the last decade there were thou-

sands of students—still young unless they have been killed in battle—who were bitter with protest against the frustrations caused by the old regime. Unrest on the farms and in the factories was widespread. In its early stages, at least, the war with China was not popular. The fact remains that whatever we discover to have been the fate of an earlier liberalism after the blackout of the Pacific war has lifted, it is certain that attempts on the part of the conquering nations to correct by *force majeure* the defects of Japan's nationalism by handing her the four freedoms on the point of a bayonet will carry with them their own defeat. In the sphere of the redirection and the reconditioning of the "Japanese mind," the prescription of Macbeth's physician is the only known cure—the patient must heal himself. This is a long-term job. Yet it may not take as long as we sometimes fear. The Japanese are a realistic people. When a situation has gone definitely against them, they say, *Shikata ga nai*—"It can't be helped"—and want to forget it and start over.

D. C. HOLTOM

Making Japan Over

A CURIOUS DICHOTOMY has prevailed in the traditional American outlook on Japan. In one mental compartment we have nurtured a set of dislikes and fears: an ingrained concern over Japanese militarism and expansionism, an easily stimulated reaction against the competition of cheap Japanese goods. Tucked away in another compartment has existed a sort of guilty conscience. Composed in part of a general belief in Japan's supposed economic handicaps, skillfully fostered by the "overpopulation" thesis of Japanese propaganda, it was also associated with a more legitimate sympathy for the difficult living conditions of the Japanese people. Since these inconsistencies of attitude were walled off in separate compartments, the necessity for reconciling them did not arise. Even the war does not seem to have given us a more inclusive and integrated concept of the problem we face in dealing with Japan. We have yet to visualize the ruthless conqueror, the intense competitor and the poverty-stricken populace as natural products of a complex social system which has its own inner logic.

This failure, or perhaps unwillingness, to look into the entity we label "Japan" carries with it inevitable penalties. It leaves us with no frame of reference within which to set proposed policies and gauge their effects. Without such a frame of reference, controversy over a "hard" or "soft" peace is the most futile of exercises. Shall we abolish Japanese industry completely, or shall we keep it in whole or in part? Shall we enforce strict controls on Japanese trade and industry indefinitely, or for a limited term? Questions such

as these cannot be answered *in vacuo*. Substance is given only as they are related to the kind of social order which develops in postwar Japan. If it is the old order, or a masked replica of it, both military and economic controls must be maintained indefinitely. Enforcement of these controls will impose a continuing burden on the world security organization, but they can hardly be relaxed without long-term, even if not immediate, risks. On the other hand, if a new democratic order arises in Japan, the road to economic freedom and to the nation's full association in the world community can be cleared without undue delay. The vital policy decision, in the first instance, will thus be a political one.

Particular circumstances existing at the end of the war will affect this decision. An early unconditional surrender would help Japan's present ruling groups to salvage the essentials of their oligarchic regime. *Per contra*, the emergence of a strong, popular resistance movement would provide the basis for a new democratic order. But the prime responsibility will still rest with the occupying powers. They can welcome or frown upon liberal popular forces, or even positively help them to develop strength if it is lacking. They can also deliberately permit or assist so-called "moderate" elements from the old ruling circle to organize the first postwar government. The latter possibility is not purely hypothetical; it tends increasingly to become the accepted Anglo-American policy.

Not without political significance is the fact that official propaganda activity, which must hew to a line

set by the State Department, carefully limits its attention to the "militarists." In this controlled propaganda campaign, the Emperor and the court circle are immune from attack. So also are the business groups, the party leaders and the bureaucrats. Strangely enough, the political complexion of the Suzuki cabinet exactly corresponds to this division, *in the reverse sense*. The "militarists" are in the back seat. The cabinet is dominated by a court-navy-bureaucrat-business coalition, with generally "moderate" political antecedents. It is just this coalition which might engineer a surrender with the hope of being able to continue in power after the war. The professional army leadership, like the Reichswehr in Germany, would also be inclined to follow a line that holds out the possibility of a future revival, even at the cost of temporary eclipse. Japan's military-naval leaders know that they are a necessary adjunct of the old regime, which has before this assumed for long periods the mask of "moderation" and pseudo-liberalism.

These facts point to a more fundamental aspect of the Japanese social structure. They refute a currently fashionable oversimplification that the "militarists" are the dominant political force in Japanese society. Actually, the key feature of Japan's social order lies in the special relationship which obtains between the monopolists (*Zaibatsu*) and the landlords. In the countryside, the large holdings of some 3,500 big landlords (including the Emperor) stand out above the meager plots of more than 5 million tenant and small-owner farm households. In the big cities, a dozen *Zaibatsu* concerns and semi-state monopolies (in which the Emperor holds large blocks of shares) dominate the banking, industrial and commercial life of the country. The nexus between *Zaibatsu* and landlords is formed by the 30 million poverty-stricken farmers, who constitute an inexhaustible reservoir of cheap labor. Even the lowest wage in mine or factory has averaged better than the livelihood in rural areas, which has often dipped toward famine conditions. Professor Shiroshi Nasu, one of the foremost students of Japan's agrarian problems, describes the situation in these terms: "Existence of up-to-date factories with high technical efficiency side by side with millions of small farms amply supplying these factories with skillful but low-wage manpower constitutes the backbone of the national economy of Japan. This relationship is made possible by the fact that the birth rate of the rural population is higher than that of the urban population."

But this "relationship" has most important effects. It condemns the mass of the Japanese people, the farmers and workers, to a chronic poverty. It stunts the home market, forcing the export of 30 to 40 percent of total production (factory and small-scale industry) in normal years. The relative paucity of local natural resources—which, however, can easily be overstressed—accentuates the difficulty. By necessity an in-

tense drive for foreign trade has characterized Japan's economy throughout this century. The cheap labor, the technical efficiency of modern factories and the severe exploitation of small-scale industry propel Japanese goods into foreign markets with great competitive force, but this misshapen economic structure is peculiarly dependent on the vicissitudes of the world economy. Economic security even for the *Zaibatsu*-landlord combination, not to mention the people, is a will-o'-the-wisp. An alternative is sought in territorial expansion—the natural, and indeed inexorable, outcome of the whole system.

Around the *Zaibatsu*-landlord core—the true essence of modern Japan—are grouped all the other elements of the ruling caste. Emperor worship, as an ideological instrument, is designed first to lead the mass of the people to accept without protest their miserable economic lot, and only secondarily to provide divine sanction for conquest. The military still wield their ruthless feudal sword, but in answer to the dictates of an unstable economy geared both to the modern machine and the tenant farmer's rise plot. A class of bureaucrats, larger even than the German professional civil service, performs the essential administrative tasks. Party leaders grace the pseudo-parliamentary façade of the regime, which is an unlimited oligarchy in actual content. The Emperor unites in himself all the diverse aspects of the oligarchy. He is the high priest of a tribal religion. But he is also the biggest landlord, a leading member of the *Zaibatsu*, the supreme head of the state and commander-in-chief of the army and navy.

In this highly complex organism each member functions in relation to the others, but the whole being has an essential vitality of its own. Assume, now, a postwar policy which lops off one limb—the "militarists." The Emperor remains; so also the bureaucracy, as well as the *Zaibatsu* and landlords. One limb is removed, but the soul, the hands and brain, and the body and heart are left. Is it logical to expect that the organism will thereafter take on a new form of life, different in any essential respect from the old? Or must we not assume that it will devote its efforts to restoring the limb which has been struck off?

An adequate postwar policy toward Japan will be framed in terms directed toward crushing the life out of this organism. It will require action by the Japanese people as well as the United Nations. The measures initially taken by the forces of occupation, however, may go far to decide how effectively the authoritarian system that has dominated Japan since 1868 will be destroyed.

Territorial issues will present the first test. In this field the decisive measures will relate not to the strategic islands of the Pacific but to Manchuria, Korea and Formosa. Maintenance of the old order in Japan, and the eventual restoration of an aggressive Japan's industrial and military strength, will be immensely facili-

tated if Japanese economic interests in the colonies are protected by the peace terms. There are today approximately 320,000 Japanese civilians in Formosa, and 750,000 each in Korea and Manchuria. Since the overwhelming majority are administrators or businessmen, closely linked to the colonial political structure, they seem likely to be swept out by military defeat. The utilities and great industrial enterprises of these colonies are largely state-controlled and should be transferred to the Chinese and Korean authorities. Japanese investments in state and private undertakings in the colonies, as in China proper, will provide the sole large and immediately available reparations payments, though quite inadequate to cover the devastation caused by the war. Assuming that these changes are applied in the peace, they will force the repatriation of Japanese civilians, eliminate potential nests of irredentists and fifth-columnists, and thus limit the scope of Japanese undercover activity in preparation for renewed aggression. Above all, they will force postwar Japan to seek the solution for her economic problem in the homeland, and so stimulate necessary modifications of the old system.

Japan will experience the economic disabilities of defeat primarily in the destruction of industry, transport and the merchant fleet, in the loss of virtually all foreign investments and assets, and in the disruption of her connections with the world market. Recovery will be slow, unless it is stimulated by the external measures, such as loans, which restored the German economy during the twenties. But such a program will carry the same dangers in Japan if it entrenches the old groups in power, even should the oligarchy be temporarily shorn of its military accessories. To be effected with safety, it would require economic controls adequate to prevent the building of an arms industry, no easy task short of continued military occupation, and the closest economic coöperation among the powers. Even then the world security organization would have to maintain sleepless vigilance. On the other hand, the restoration of Japan's economy is clearly desirable, as much in the interests of the outside world as in those of the Japanese people. Industrial development and foreign trade, moreover, represent a necessary condition for an economically healthy Japan. Can the outside world assist such a development without the necessity of standing perpetually on guard?

Only under one condition: that the stranglehold of the *Zaibatsu* and landlords on Japan's economic life, and on the welfare and livelihood of the Japanese people, be broken. Agrarian reform constitutes the starting point for the needed changes. The break-up of the landed estates, an essential preliminary in this task, has to be associated with a thoroughgoing democratization of the agricultural coöperatives, thus far used mainly as an agency of authoritarian regimentation. Through the coöperatives, with which the Japanese farmer has

had much experience, can be handled such problems as the purchase of supplies, the marketing of products and the provision of cheap credit. This program of agrarian reform, however, cannot be expected to work unless it is associated with measures curbing the great industrial and commercial monopolies. Along with railways, communications and the electric-power industry, all of which have been already nationalized, the large modern-factory enterprises will have to be taken over and operated by the state. Small and middle-scale enterprises, freed of the tribute formerly exacted by the *Zaibatsu* monopolies, should be able to develop on a much wider and more profitable scale. Previous restrictions on labor organization should be removed. The higher living standards of the farmers and workers, by providing greater domestic purchasing power, will expand the home market and reduce the pressure to export, even though a large and expanding foreign trade will continue to be a necessity.

Economic reforms of this scope and character, it is obvious, cannot be expected of a government staffed by representatives of the *Zaibatsu*, the court circle and the old bureaucracy. Far-reaching internal political changes, deriving from a government well to the left of center, must be carried through before economic measures such as these can be instituted. A period of transition, during which the old regime is thoroughly destroyed in the wake of defeat, is a prime necessity if the eventual political outcome is to be favorable. The cardinal mistake would be speedy recognition of a new government formed by members of the oligarchy, however "moderate" the candidates put forward might appear. This danger will be intensified if the groups now in control should effect an unconditional surrender that enabled them to put through a minimum set of so-called political reforms. We should take warning from the fate of the Weimar Republic, which left the Junkers, the monopolists and the Reichswehr to function within an outwardly democratic framework.

The principle that free elections be held before a new government is established and recognized should be adhered to rigidly. Such elections, preferably to a constituent assembly, should be carried through under United Nations auspices, rather than those of a hold-over Japanese regime. The assembly should draft a new and democratic constitution, replacing the baldly authoritarian Constitution of 1889. If it decided that an emperor is to be retained, some guarantee would exist that he would be a genuinely constitutional monarch, functioning under a constitution deriving from the people and not handed down as an imperial "gift." In these political preliminaries, every evidence of popular initiative and resistance to the old order, even if expressed in turbulent forms such as the seizure of landlords' estates, would be the most essential testimony that a new order is not only required but practical and feasible. Such popular resistance would be the

guarantee that a constructive postwar policy could be speedily implemented in our dealings with Japan. If it should develop and then be crushed because of our taste for "order" and fear of "chaos," the most promising avenue toward the building of a peaceful Far East would thereby be closed.

Internal economic reforms would have provided the essential prerequisite for satisfying the legitimate economic needs of the Japanese people. Elimination of armament expenditure, which has weighed heavily on the Japanese economy for two generations, would furnish large additional resources for postwar reconstruction purposes. To create a fully prosperous Japan, however, substantial assistance from the outside world would still be required. The soundest contribution would be the speedy removal of all unnecessary barriers to the development of Japan's foreign trade. This would be the more necessary since the increased wages

going to the Japanese worker would partially reduce the previous competitive advantage of Japanese goods, even though a smaller differential advantage might continue to exist.

Economic assistance to Japan by the United Nations will have to be earned. It will hardly be forthcoming in time to prevent the Japanese people from passing through an onerous postwar transition. The needs of the countries devastated by Japan's war of conquest will have first priority. In the meeting of these needs, a toll will almost certainly be levied even on Japan's limited postwar productive resources. When the Japanese people have met this test, and when they have accomplished the needed domestic social and political readjustments, they will be entitled to turn to the United Nations for those broader measures of economic coöperation which will lay a solid basis for the peace structure in the Pacific.

T. A. BISSE

A Voice from the Grave

Introductory Note.—At this most tragic moment in world history, when Nazi concentration camps are being "discovered" by the American public, I wish it to hear a voice from a Chinese grave. The Kuomintang which rules China also maintains concentration camps, secret "Courts," an official Youth Corps, rigid control of the press, thought-control in all educational institutions and a Gestapo exactly like that of Hitler Germany.

The war against Japan which the Chinese people have fought so long, has not halted the Kuomintang terror against the people.

One of the chief demands of the democratic forces of China is the immediate abolition of Kuomintang concentration camps in which thousands of people are imprisoned for no other reason than opposing the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. How many men and women have been done to death in these camps or in the dark cells of Kuomintang prisons, mankind will never know. For nearly two decades Chinese anti-fascists fought the dictatorship which ruled their country. This dictatorship, like that of the Nazis in Germany up to Pearl Harbor, is recognized by America as a "legitimate, constituted" government.

The most famous, learned and influential "subversive element" and the most eminent Chinese writer in hundreds of years, was the late Lu Hsün (sometimes spelled Lusin), some of whose writings have been done into English by Mr. Chi-cheng Wang of Columbia and published by the Columbia University Press (*Ah Q and Others*). The "killing of the innocents," as Lu Hsün called the Kuomintang terror, so deeply affected him, so filled him with bitter spiritual torment, that it can be said unequivocally that he himself was a victim of fascism. Because of his advanced age and his great eminence, the Kuomintang dared not kill him, yet he often had to stay in hiding and for years lived a semi-secret existence. Technically he died of tuberculosis, but a foreign physician advised him to save himself by leaving China and living quietly, with good food, for two or

three years. He refused, saying, "Everyone cannot run away. Someone must stay and fight."

He preferred death to the abandonment of his people to fascism, and he despised Chinese who fled to the safe refuge of America where many prospered and became the adored darlings of women's clubs. Shortly before he died, he published a volume of the selected works of Käthe Kollwitz, the famous German artist of the masses, a Socialist enemy of the Nazis who is perhaps now dead, together with some two million other German anti-fascists who were done to death in Nazi concentration camps. Lu Hsün published the works of Kollwitz as a protest against the oppression of the people by fascists, whether German or Chinese. The following selection from his writings includes his tribute to the great German artist, two of his short pieces and a letter from one of his followers.

AGNES SMEDLEY

On Käthe Kollwitz

ONE MAY PASS a heap of paper ashes on the wild earth,¹ or many carvings in a ruined wall, and never see them. Yet each is eloquent with love, mourning, or with wrath stronger than the human voice can express. A few people do see such emotions reflected in them.

In 1931—I forget the month—the first number of the magazine the *Dipper*, appeared. It was banned soon after birth. Its first number published the woodcut of a mother with eyes closed in grief, holding her baby in her outstretched arms. This woodcut, "Sacrifice," was the first of a series entitled "War." Professor Käthe Kollwitz was the artist and this was the first of her works to be introduced to China.

¹ The Chinese burn paper money at the graves of their dead.
A. S.

I contributed this woodcut to the *Dipper* in memory of Jou Shih, who had been my student and friend and who had coöperated with me in introducing foreign literature to China. He had a pronounced liking for woodcuts, and once compiled three volumes of American and European works of this nature. . . . For some unknown reason he was arrested shortly afterwards and shot to death. Perhaps from fear, or because it was forbidden, no newspaper reported this killing. . . .

At that time a volume of Käthe Kollwitz's graphics was in the mail on the way from Europe to China. In it I found poverty, sickness, hunger, death . . . also, of course, struggle and bloodshed. . . . As in the self-portrait of the artist, so in this volume there was more of love and pity than hatred and wrath. To me, the self-portrait seemed representative of the mothers of all who are insulted and injured. . . .

Chinese who have had no opportunity to travel abroad, often have the idea that all white people are either preachers of the ideas of Jesus, or well dressed, well fed managers of business firms given to the habit of kicking people around when out of humor. But the works of Käthe Kollwitz show that the "insulted and injured"—our natural friends—exist in very many other places on earth, and have among them artists who mourn, protest and struggle on their behalf.

The Chinese press today is always publishing pictures of Hitler. They are all alike: all show Hitler at the moment he is bellowing. One becomes weary of the repetition. But in the works of the German artist Kollwitz, one sees a different kind of people: approachable, ready to accept and give sympathy, and devoid of cheap heroics. . . .

This is the fifth year since Jou Shih was murdered, and the works of Käthe Kollwitz were introduced to China by him. According to the German way of counting, the woman artist is now seventy years of age. This is an occasion deserving our celebration. This great artist has been forced into silence today, but more and more her works have penetrated to the Far East. No force can separate human beings from art.



Lithograph by Käthe Kollwitz
Reproduced by courtesy of Kleemann Galleries

On Secret Death

ONLY RECENTLY I learned the brutality of secret death.

In China, before the revolution, a prisoner condemned to death was usually led through the busy thoroughfares where he was permitted to shout *Yuen Wang* (to protest his innocence), abuse the judge, relate his own brave deeds and show that he had no fear of death. At the moment of execution, by-standers would applaud, and the news of his courage would spread. In my boyhood I was frequently told such stories. I thought the conditions very barbarous and the practice very cruel.

An entirely different opinion was expressed by Mr. Chu Tang in a recent article in *Yu Chou Feng*, of which Dr. Lin Yutang is editor. Mr. Chu Tang thinks the applause for a condemned man expresses praise for the defeated and sympathy for the weak. "It is a high ideal," he says. "However, it is not good for human society because sympathy for the weak as against the strong means non-recognition of the strong; and praise for the defeated means non-recognition for the successful hero." So, he says, "usually victorious kings and emperors killed hundreds of thousands of innocent people that their power might be maintained for a hundred years."

It is a pity that "victorious kings and emperors" could retain power only at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. They had no better method. This does not mean that I have any interest in devising a plan for them! But it leads me to think that "victorious kings and emperors" were benevolent when they allowed a prisoner condemned to death to say what he wanted to say before the public, and that these rulers were courageous and confident of their power when they permitted him to become intoxicated with pride and make his fate known to the public before execution. The practice contained some kindness.

Today, when I am told of the death of a friend, or a student, but learn that no one knows the details of how he died, I find that I grieve more deeply and feel more shocked than when I learn of all the details of the killing. I can imagine the awful loneliness which overtakes one who is killed secretly by butchers in a dark room.

"Victorious kings and emperors" do not kill people secretly. . . . They adopt it only when they cannot hold power without it. Probably it has been practised in many places. "Civilized order" then rules in cities and people become quiet! But just imagine the anguish of a man killed secretly, as compared with those publicly executed. When I first read Dante's "Inferno," I was horrified at the imagined cruelty in the *Divine Comedy*. But now, with more experience, I see how mild that cruelty was. Dante's imagination failed to reach the depths of the present-day inferno with its secret cruelty.

A Fairy Tale

THIS IS A fairy tale after the fashion of "A Fairy Tale," by Willi Bredel, the exiled German anti-Nazi poet, written to commemorate the eightieth year of Heinrich Heine's death.

Once upon a time there was a state whose authority oppressed the people because it knew the people were its most powerful enemy. To it, the Latinization of the alphabet was like machine guns, and woodcuts were like tanks.¹ Authorities who claimed control of a territory still did not dare leave or board a train at regular stations. They did not travel by land at all, but by air. They were so physically frail and so sensitive to the least change in weather that they caught cold easily, especially when important problems arose! All their followers caught cold from them. They also became sick. To understand the real meaning or definition of words [*in the press* - A. S.] people had to refer to an unprinted dictionary in which are many fancy explanations of different terms.

Big volumes of laws were published by students returned from foreign countries. These men extracted all valuable sections of existing foreign laws and compiled them into a set of laws which bore no resemblance to the laws of any foreign land. Between the lines of the compiled laws, one well versed in the use of the unprinted dictionary could read. . . .

Of course there was a Court. Offenders who could read between the lines of the laws usually did not protest or argue before this court, for that was the practice of evil men only and was liable to call down a sentence "to be rigidly applied." There was also a High Court. But the accused who knew the unprinted dictionary never appealed to it either, for that also was the practice of evil men only and was liable to call down a harsh punishment.

One early morning, many policemen raided an art school. Several men, some in gowns and some in foreign suits, rushed here and there looking for something, while policemen armed with pistols followed them. In a few minutes a man in a foreign suit took hold of the shoulder of a young student eighteen years of age who was in the dormitory. . . .

Years of experience had taught young people to keep nothing in their possession. This young student, however, had kept a few letters in which his mother's miserable death was mentioned. He was only eighteen! It might be that he valued these letters so much that he took a chance and did not destroy them. The man in the foreign suit read the letters carefully. . . . When he came to the words: ". . . the whole world is a cannibal feast! Your mother fell victim to it and countless other

mothers will fall victim also . . .," he frowned, took a pencil from his pocket and underlined the words.

"What does this mean?" he asked the young man. "Who was responsible for your mother falling victim to cannibalism? Is there real cannibalism in the world? Do you mean that we are cannibals and made a victim of your mother?" His eyes bulged. . . .

"Oh, no!" The youth seemed horrified.

But the raider . . . folded up the letters and thrust them in his pocket. Then he went to a pile of woodblocks, woodcut knives, woodcut prints, newspaper clippings, also copies of *The Iron Steam* and *Quiet Flows the Don*. He motioned to a policeman. . . .

"What are you taking away?" The young man realized what might happen. The man in the foreign suit replied with a glance and, motioning to another policeman, said:

"I give him to you!"

Like a tiger the policeman sprang upon the young man. Clutching him by the back of the coat, he pushed him out of the dormitory where two other students about his age were also being held in the clutches of two policemen, while a group of students and teachers looked on.

An Authentic Letter

DEAR TEACHER:

Since you want to know what happened to me after I left the detention jail, allow me to give you a brief report:

On the last day of the last month of that year, we three were transferred from the Provincial Government to the High Court. As soon as we reached there, we were brought up for the first hearing. It was very strange because the Prosecutor asked only three questions:

"What is your name? . . . How old are you? . . . Where is your native town?"

These questions constituted the entire hearing. We were then sent to the Military Prison.

Anyone who wishes to experience the art of ruling of the ruling class may find it in this Military Prison. They are displeased if their extreme brutality does not end in the death of their victims. . . . Whenever the political situation grows tense, the important political prisoners are shot in one batch after another, and this regardless of the term of imprisonment imposed. For instance, when Nanchang was in danger, 22 men were shot to death within a quarter of an hour. At the time the Fukien People's Government was inaugurated, many others were also stood before the firing squad. The vegetable garden inside the prison wall is the execution ground. Naked corpses of the prisoners are buried in the soil to help fertilize the garden.

After two and a half months in this prison, we were told the charge against us. Again the Judge asked us

¹The Kuomintang government forbade the Latinization of the Chinese language and regarded woodcuts, which dealt with reality instead of paintings of bamboos, birds and flowers, as illegal and Communist-inspired. - A. S.

just three questions. What was the charge? Except for the legal paragraphs I can still remember a large part of it:

... The Woodcut Research Society, originated by Ch—— and H——, is directed by Communists and [is] a body to study proletarian art. The accused are all members of this society. ... As discovered, all works produced by them are either woodcuts of Red Army officers or pictures depicting the misery of hungry workers. These are used to create class conflict and to express the idea that one day the proletariat will be victorious. ...

Not long afterwards, we were brought to trial. In the courtroom were five *Lao Yeh* sitting in a row. Very dignified. I was no longer so nervous. The picture of Daumier's "Judge" flashed across my mind.

On the eighth day after the trial, we were taken to hear the sentence. Apart from the charges already made in the previous statement, the latter read:

For these deeds, the prisoners are hereby sentenced to five years' imprisonment each, in accordance with Article X of the Laws relating to the Urgent Suppression of Crime against the Republic, and Provision 30 of Article 20 of the Criminal Code. ... The accused, however, are ignorant young men and it is rather pitiful that they were led astray. Therefore, in accordance with Provision X of Article XXX, their sentence is commuted to two and a half years' imprisonment. ...

In short, from the day of my arrest to the day of my release, I was in three slaughter-houses in which people were killed. I ought to be grateful to them because they were kind enough to refrain from chopping off my head, and still more grateful for the abundant knowledge which I received. To speak of torture alone, I have now learned that there are: 1. The whip. 2. The tiger bench. 3. The lever.

These are comparatively mild. Under the lever treatment, the prisoner is forced to his knees. An iron bar is thrust between the upper and lower leg. Then two to eight strong men stand on the ends of the iron bar and try to force the prisoner to confess.

4. To kneel on red-hot iron chains. ...

5. "Something to eat." This is peppered water, petroleum, vinegar or alcohol, forced into the body through the nostrils of the victim.

6. ... I cannot find a proper name for this form of torture. The victim is bound with his arms behind him. Then by means of a cord tied to his thumbs or wrists he is hung up and whipped.

But I thought the most cruel torture of all was that inflicted on a young peasant who was with me in the Detention Jail. The *Lao Yeh* said he was a Red Army commander. He refused to admit it. Oh, then there was torture for him! They drove needles beneath his fingernails with a hammer. First one needle was driven in. He refused to speak. Then the second needle. No confession. Then the third ... the fourth ... till all his ten

fingers were finished. Even now the picture of that young man with the white face, hollow eyes and bleeding fingers flashes before my eyes. I can never forget him. Pain overcomes me when I think of him.

It was not until my release that I learned of the reason for my arrest. We students were dissatisfied with the school, particularly with the chief of the Physical Training Department who was also the political intelligence officer for the Provincial Headquarters of the Kuomintang. He was the man at the bottom of our arrest. In order to stifle the dissatisfaction of the whole student-body he used us three—the only members of the Woodcut Research Society left in the school—as victims by which he could demonstrate his terrorism.

So much for this brief story. Now, when I lift my head to look at the pale moonlight outside my window, something cold grips my heart. I think I am not such a weakling, yet cold grips my heart. Yours, Jen Fan.

LU HSUN

Trieste and Western Istria

THE *New Republic* was right when, in its issue of May 14, it stated that as long as political and economic nationalism is in the ascendancy, any settlement of the Trieste problem or any other analogous problem will be unjust to someone. "The only true solution is to proceed as rapidly as possible to make the problem disappear by rendering national boundaries of small importance. The citizenship and economic fortunes of Europeans should be as far as possible held in common."

In fact, if Italy and Yugoslavia were to become partners in the same customs union, the Italo-Yugoslav frontier would no longer be a political and economic, but only an administrative boundary. Unfortunately, there is no prospect that such a solution is at hand. Meanwhile, without waiting for the millennium, the problems of the border territories have to be settled with no undue delay. Moreover, even if national frontiers were disestablished, administrative boundaries would still remain to be drawn up. People have to know to whom they must pay rates in the district they inhabit and who should be responsible for the upkeep of schools, roads, sanitary services, etc.

As the *New Republic* rightly stated, the city of Trieste is inhabited by both Italians and Yugoslavs, but its majority is of Italian nationality, while its minority and the surrounding countryside is Slav. Analogous is the case of the city of Gorizia and the cities of Western Istria. They also are inhabited by a population which is Italian in its majority, while the country around is compactly Slav. The case of Eastern Istria is different. Its population is compactly Slav; it intends and it is entitled to join Yugoslavia.

The American experts who in 1919, on behalf of

President Wilson, traced what would have been the most suitable frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia, were scholars who were not activated by any bias in favor of the Italians. They drew a line that almost perfectly coincides with that which divides the mixed Italo-Slav territory from the Slav territory. They took into account not only dead figures but social conditions. They thought that the solution most conducive to peace, *provided the rights of national minorities were respected*, was to establish Italian rule over the mixed territory. The Wilson line of 1919 might be improved in favor of the Slavs, keeping in mind the principle that the fewer Slavs left with the Italians, the better. But on the whole, the Wilson frontier would be the best *provided that the personal and political rights of the Slav minority were respected by the Italians and provided the Slavs respected the rights of the Italian minority within their jurisdiction*.

The problem can be solved by the same method which solved it in Switzerland and in the United States—by granting equal personal and political rights to every man regardless of his nationality.

Unfortunately, the treatment meted out to the Slavs by the Fascists for more than twenty years was infamous. The Italians are not to be trusted when they say that they will not do it again. But do the Slavs deserve to be trusted more than the Italians? What did the Serbs do in Macedonia and Albania after their victories of 1912? Were King Alexander and Stoyadinovich better than Mussolini? What did the Serb fascists do during these last years against the Croats, and the Croat fascists against Serbians and Mohammedans? What about Pavelich and Mihailovich? The history of all mixed territories in Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, is the history of hatreds and brutality.

In all mixed territories some external force must be set up to protect minorities against majorities until the time comes when everybody, after trying the wrong way, realizes that honesty pays best.

Were Yugoslavs and Italians reasonable animals, they should agree to entrust to a commission of arbitrators the task of drawing a new boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia and of devising measures to protect national minorities through supernational intervention. I am pretty sure that any arbitration that blends and balances all the factors in the case would allot Trieste and Western Istria to Italy. But if it allotted them to the Slavs, Italians should bow before it, and the Slavs should do the same if the decision went against them.

The *economic* problem of the *port* of Trieste has nothing to do with the *national* problems of the *city* of Trieste, of the *city* of Gorizia and of the *cities* of Western Istria and their countrysides. One could give a perfect solution to the first and a wretched one to the latter problem, and vice versa.

On this point, I beg to correct a mistake in the editorial paragraph the *New Republic* devoted to this matter. Trieste is not "the chief port of exit and entry for trade with Yugoslavia and the interior," nor should "Yugoslavs feel about it much as citizens of the United States might have felt if New Orleans had remained in possession of France or New York in possession of the Netherlands." No more than the small northeastern corner of Yugoslavia (Slovenia) falls within the economic hinterland of Trieste. This port is far removed from the center of the Yugoslav national structure. Fiume (Rieka), Spalato (Split) and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) are the chief ports of exit and entry for trade with Yugoslavia and the interior, not to mention Saloniki. The port of Trieste is not to Yugoslavia what New Orleans or New York is to the United States, but what San Diego is to California. Trieste's hinterland stretches as far as Austria, Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia, and not so far as Belgrade or Macedonia.

Trieste cannot be exclusively either an Italian or a Yugoslav port. It is an international port and should work under international management. Italian, Yugoslav, Austrian and Czecho-Slovak delegates and representatives from the countries which have a sufficient amount of business in that port should form the managing corporation.

Let me add that if a supernational control honestly guaranteed the personal and political rights of both Italians and Slavs, and if an international corporation took care of the port and of the railways and customs system in the hinterland, little concern should be felt about which flag was hoisted over the city and the port. I would hoist over it not only the Italian and the Yugoslav flags, but all the flags of the world.

Let me add also that even if the problem is solved against all principles of justice and common sense—and I am afraid that it will be solved in the worst possible way—the Italians should feel duty-bound to declare that they will not regard a wrong solution as a pretext for resuming Mussolini's policies of hatred, threats, bluff and war (whenever possible). Trieste or no Trieste, Italy should endeavor to live on friendly terms with all her neighbors, and especially with Yugoslavia. No matter how great and grievous is the injustice one suffers, no government is entitled to make war and all the other governments should join forces instantly to put down such an attempt. But if an injustice has been committed, justice has to be restored, and the victim of injustice is not only entitled but is pledged to protest steadily against it and to demand that it be corrected. Friendship must not be a slavish acceptance of wrong. If right and common sense were to be stamped down, the Italians should remain friends with their neighbors. But as friends, they should demand a return to right and common sense.

GAETANO SALVEMINI

Washington Notes

Problems, International and Domestic

WHEN the Hoboken ferry docks, it reverses its engines. The craft shudders, the water is churned into green and white, the engines vibrate. A tremendous commotion is kicked up under the surface, though not very much actually happens to the ferryboat itself.

That is the situation, more or less, in Washington now. A transition is under way. By a coincidence unparalleled save after the Lincoln assassination, presidential and military epochs ended simultaneously. Another great factor is also added. An untried President, with an untried Secretary of State, is wrestling with the unprecedented world problem of keeping a war-born coalition intact—a coalition upon which most people think the hope of the next generation's peace depends. Russia is proving increasingly balky, the international problems surge and boil in whirlpools of half-concealed conflict, and simultaneously the craft encounters the currents of a dozen domestic emergencies. Writing news in Washington these days is dull. It is just a monotonous succession of crises. Standing on the Washington ferry, nothing much seems to be happening—that is, not until you look at the water.

In the next 60 or 90 days we should begin to know the answers on a number of important points. We should begin to find out, for example, whether, and how far, we can coöperate with Russia; how far Truman can coöperate with Congress after all his wooing; whether the brakes on civilian reconversion are going to hold, or whether it is going to be another theatre-panic rush as after World War I; whether Congress is likely to accept the results of the San Francisco Conference, and whether, as a preliminary, it will take the Bretton Woods fiscal plan, the reciprocal-trade-agreements extension and repeal the Johnson Act; whether Congress really intends to do anything about full employment and 60 million jobs, or will just blunder its way through—which seems likely.

Well, these are big problems; the returns will be coming in soon.

I found out this week that the amount involved in present annual overtime pay for American workers is \$12 billion. That figure is agreed upon by economists at the Labor and Commerce Departments. It is the stake involved in the great controversy over wages.

From the worker's point of view, his share in national overtime means comfort and security. He will fight to keep it. From the manufacturer's view, the aggregate amount is important, too; take away \$12 billion suddenly, in mass purchasing power, and a whole lot of gadgets and Detroit automobiles won't be sold. On the other hand, if factories begin to close and idleness grows, the extra sixth day's work and time-and-a-half overtime will fade instantly. Just by turning the American working force back to a normal work week of 40 hours, \$12 billion will be slashed off the national income.

Economists give an academic answer to this. Theoretically, at any rate, "take-home" wages can be cut back without injury if prices of goods and services are reduced simultaneously. Of course, no nation has ever succeeded in accomplishing this difficult feat of balancing, but that isn't to say it can't be done. However, the practical fact is that a big battle is brewing, with workers demanding higher hourly rates to compensate for shorter hours.

Mary Jones has been earning \$40 a week, with overtime, in an aircraft factory, at 85 cents an hour. When that closes down she will find she can earn maybe \$25 a week as a clerk in a store, or as help in a laundry. Mary Jones, multiplied a million times, won't like it.

If these things aren't managed deftly and unemployment really takes hold, there are possibilities of very nasty social conflict: whites against blacks; men against women; veterans against the field. A good many people in Washington are aware of the danger, but unfortunately, control is still pretty much in the hands of the military. Vinson and Krug are having the hardest kind of a time finding out what the armed forces project in the way of needs beyond 90 days hence.

The military poured out tremendous war contracts when they got the wind up over the threatened German break-through in the Battle of the Bulge. These contracts have not been canceled. One shrewd observer here expects little change in the present 90-day period—the length of time for which the military authorities are now willing to divulge advance supply requirements to civilian agencies. Not much change may come even in the second similar period. Then, he fears, the sudden war cancellations and cut-backs may be fantastic. Big war plants may be shut down with two weeks', one week's, a few days' notice. Throw the engines into reverse fast enough and instead of a ferryboat going into a dock you have the metaphor of an automobile hitting a lamp-post.

Problems like these make a lot of Washington issues that have heretofore seemed academic, very real and immediate. Take the question of unemployment compensation. When the George bill was substituted for the Kilgore bill, Congress turned this matter over to the states. The states have been accumulating a sizable cushion of unemployment reserves, estimated at \$6 billion. This is a big sum, even though Reconversion Director Vinson estimates that one and a half million workers will lose their jobs by December, and another three millions by June, 1946. He hopes this will not be cumulative, however, and that the total, a year hence, will be only around two and a half million. Well—the states' jobless funds should help cushion this shock, except that they are very badly distributed. The worker in California will get \$18 a week, say, but a man out of work in North Carolina, only \$7. The number of weeks for which this will be paid varies vastly, too. In fact there are as wide—and unjust—discrepancies in unemployment compensation as there are in educational advantages among the 48 states.

If you can't be a rich man's son, the great trick in the United States is to manage to be born, and work, in a rich state.

T. R. B.

Washington

Skin Deep

THE ENCHANTED COTTAGE" is not very good but it is likable. The idea that love makes ugly people appear beautiful to each other is one that the movies don't work every day, and is generally more distinguished than the ones they work more often. There is a good performance by Dorothy McGuire as a homely maid in a cottage she believes is enchanted, and serious, talented ones by Mildred Natwick, the housekeeper who lives in the past, Herbert Marshall, a blind composer who lives next door, a small boy who is his nephew, and Robert Young, who rents the cottage to hide his ugliness from society. He falls in love with the homely maid and finds that love helps both their looks. Next to Miss McGuire, who not only does her usual skillful and sensitive job, but projects emotion that seems less muffled and narcissistic, the best part of the movie is her wedding gown, which is the only completely unconventional and imaginative, subtle and beautiful dress ever to appear in a modern American movie. It is designed along Roman lines, for a larger person than Miss McGuire, which is in keeping with the character of the girl who has no talent for makeup or dress and lives away from people and fashions.

"The Enchanted Cottage" seems for the most part overspecialized and oversimplified. The blindness of the composer is constantly pointed at by the dialogue and by centering scenes on his eyes, so that you feel it is constantly being rubbed over your face, and to a greater or less extent so are the housekeeper's enchanted moods, the nitwit destructiveness of the hero's parents, the lovers' kisses, the hero's shame over his ugliness, the acting that seems vacuum-packed and the atmosphere of the room when it is enchanted. The subject of ugliness, the love of two ugly people, and what is involved in each, probably could have turned up less simple problems and been played against more substantial opposition. Here it is mostly a matter of seeing a person sulking or disturbed over his ugliness, being advised by a sensitive friend to have faith in himself, find a hobby or depend on love, and in the final scene showing him telling somebody how wonderful he feels and what did it. The movie ends just as the lovers are about to face the world, which is the point I wish it had reached an hour or so earlier, because the most exciting scene happens when the girl does go through the kind of encounter they are headed for at the end and that they have so much trouble with. It takes place at a USO dance and is the one scene in which the girl's actual feeling about her ugliness and the reaction of others to it is expressed completely believably and with great effect.

"Dillinger" is the work of a Monogram unit made up mainly of the producers, the King brothers, and the writer, Philip Yordan, which is one of the few B-movie units in Hollywood that takes itself seriously. It is further discouraging evidence that the worthwhile work in B films will generally be done in gangster, mystery or horror stories. Yordan and Director Nosseck try moderately hard not to romanticize Dillinger's life. They cast Lawrence Tierney, a malevolent-looking actor with no audience following, as Dillinger, and restrict his acting to heavy expressions of brutality. There are no hair-raising chases or heroic scenes of gangsters holding out against the police. The movie is,

in effect, a listing of the various proved ways of holding up a train, breaking out of jail, pulling bank robberies, and of how best to kick, slap, cut, frighten and kill. Tierney's face has coldness, but it is too handsome and actorish to indicate Dillinger's character or the nature of what he went through, and he is never seen in contrast with anyone less hard-faced, kill-minded or vengeful. It is better-made than either of the other movies reviewed here, but I don't think it will tell you more about Dillinger than you could guess and it will tell you almost nothing of what produced him.

"Salome, Where She Danced" is trash, but it is one of the few completely straight-faced gags Hollywood has made, and is pleasantly without talent or worry over the fact. The only possible explanation of what produced the script is that it was made to exhibit a Technicolor special named Yvonne de Carlo. The movie starts near Appomattox with General Lee telling a blond soldier named Cleve and a brunette war correspondent named Steve that "there can be no standing still." This doesn't answer anything discernible at the time, but the film follows the advice as though it did, getting through in the next hour every costume, environment and set that you saw last year. The movie uses at least ten more nationalities than its nearest competitor, a Pathé newsreel I once saw, and mixes them so well that in one scene a gang of Arizona rustlers rows into San Francisco Bay to steal a Chinese junk run by a mandarin who speaks in a porridge-thick Scotch accent and who sits one room away from an Oriental version of Salome's dance done by a Viennese ballerina in Chinese costume who is said to have started the Austro-Prussian war. Most of the affair is a frame-up arranged by a Russian colonel to catch the head cattle-rustler who is the son of Abby Blunt of Virginia, a friend of General Lee's. If Hollywood ever has a Dadaist period, which is unlikely, "Salome" will be its precursor.

MANNY FARBER

A Communication

Yankee in China

SIR: This letter represents an over-all impression that I am anxious to convey to liberals at home in the United States. I would assure you, most honestly, that prior to my arrival in China my thoughts were impartial and my mind open and free from bias. That state of mind has since been altered by a certain, though definite, margin.


I am anxious that you know of these things, first, to prove that the American serviceman abroad is as much interested in the cause of democracy as is any delegate to any conference—and, theoretically, as much as any congressman at any session—and, second, I hope that whatever conclusions, whatever observations are herewith made, will in the long run support the struggle for recognition of certain trends of politics and thought not currently publicized. China is not completely the mess that some periodicals have described—under the veneer there is yet hope for freedom and democracy.

I have been in China since the beginning of the year. In the interim it has been my very good fortune to correspond and speak with a vast number of intelligent Chinese who are

active in the educational, political and cultural life of China. My observations have been many. I have seen poverty and selfishness, disinterest in the war, Kuomintang brutality, censorship and totalitarian life.

The recent visit of the distinguished Americans, Wilbur Forrest, Ralph McGill and Carl Ackerman, was something of a farce. Their mission was to investigate freedom of the press, but, in the opinion of many, it failed. Kuomintang officials fêted the distinguished journalists and pulled a goodly bit of wool over their eyes. I trust that their intelligence nevertheless enabled them to draw some astute conclusions.

A local newspaper, the *Hua Hsi Wan Pao*, on the first of April, this year, carried a story datelined "Flash—Chungking (by telephone)," which announced that Minister of Information Dr. Wong Shih-chieh had told the Americans that "herewith non-military news will not be censored before publication. . . . As soon as the war ends censorship will be abolished entirely." On the following day the paper admitted the story to have been an April Fool's Day joke. Freedom of the press in China does not exist. There are clandestine papers, nevertheless. All liberalism is frowned upon, by the Central Government. Several of the country's outspoken exponents of democracy have "disappeared" from public life. Some of them have been imprisoned, some tortured, some killed. Freedom of thought is



dead, and though "thought discipline" is encouraged by the Central Government, many groups of intelligent young men and women studying in "Free" China universities have suddenly become vitally interested in democracy. The word appeals to them. It is mentioned more and more in underground meetings, in the shops, occasionally in the classroom. The word democracy means much to them because it has been suppressed in this republic. It is dangerous—unwise—for one man to proclaim democracy here, but when three or four thousand students band together, they are strong and courageous enough to speak their minds.

What is the remedy? To suggest one would be explosive. Personally, I am interested, as are many thinkers in China today, in the democratic platform of the Yen'an government. But to say more on this subject would bring on the accusation that disunity among the Allies is advocated. Nothing could be more absurd. I only hope with all my heart that Americans recognize that Mao Tze-tung's government is inflicting very definite damage on the Japanese war machine. His forces have heroically rescued American pilots and crews downed behind the lines. They are harassing the enemy; his supplies, his troops, his communications, within his own camp. The sad part about all this is that the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies are equipped with inferior weapons, inferior gunpowder, crudely fashioned by themselves. They have fashioned other things with their own hands and brains: hospitals, free schools, efficient agricultural systems. They have never abetted fascism; nor

have they sought its aid. They are an industrious, intelligent people—not the armed barbarians depicted by spokesmen of the Generalissimo. There have been mistakes in the past, but these are done with. We, too, were very young once.

A common criticism by the Kuomintang is that the democrats of Yen'an represent an armed party, and that no nation can survive when political parties within it back up their various demands through a show of arms. Normally that would be true; and certainly so in America.

But in China—this land of oppressed, ignorant, diseased masses—there is a complete lack of unity. One does not speak of parties in China; one speaks of war lords and individual governments. One does not speak of a democratic center of control; one speaks of the one-party dictatorship at Chungking.

The National Army is an enigma. At this moment of writing, there is a great deal of unrest among the populace because of methods employed by the Central Government in recruiting men for the army. There is no Selective Service. It is all fairly much a hit-or-miss proposition. Recruits are seized on the streets, and herded or locked in tea-houses to await processing. Many such men starve while waiting for army attention. Many such men later die in the army of malnutrition and lack of sufficient medical care.

Those who can afford to pay to stay out of the army (an authoritative Chinese newspaper, the *Hua Hsi Jih Pao*, places the current price at \$200,000 in Chinese currency, or roughly about \$285 American at the current black-market rate of exchange), pay to stay out. This has brought about the popular expression "coolie army," for no man of China's lower classes can afford to buy his way out of conscription. Because of this, there have been instances of kidnapping and shanghaiing. (In this connection, the cartoon herewith, copied from the *Hsin Hsin Hsin Wen*, may be of interest.)

University students and scholars are exempted from military service. In America this practice would be ruinous. But in China it is completely sensible. One man in ten thousand knows how to read. It is imperative that the present system of education be improved and enlarged. In Russia, the Communists have found it practical to allow talented artists, musicians and writers to continue their painting, composing and writing. In China it is practical and beneficial to allow students to continue their studies, so that they may in turn disseminate knowledge. Any man can learn to operate a trench mortar. There is but one disadvantage at present. Upon graduation, the student with his Ph. D., or his degree in civil engineering, is frequently unable to find suitable employment.

Progressives back home in America should be interested to know that the seeds of democracy are germinating among the students of China. They are hungry for news of democracy. Censorship is a cataract in their eye. They know too little about Washington, about Yen'an, about London. Yet theirs is the desire, the search, the ambition.

Lately there have been minor riots in this particular vicinity of China. One was that of the local Youth Corps. Some of these boys, whose ages vary from five to eighteen or twenty, are allegedly Boy Scouts. Unfortunately, many components of this Kuomintang-sponsored organization are fascistic and military. These particular units are led by young thugs and toughs.

On this particular day, the Youth Corps banded together after a day of parading and ceremony to protest a rise in prices at the local theatres. Hollywood could not have staged a better mob scene. The youths began their demonstration by hurling rocks through the theatre windows (glass panes are at a premium in this province). Encouraged by a large crowd of enthusiastic riot-lovers, the uniformed children ripped down signs, sent marquees hurtling to the ground, smashed box offices, pummeled brick walls. From the balcony windows of several theatres, seats were thrown, torn curtains discarded. This scene was repeated at all the theatres in the city about which I write—all but one. Here, the management had paid "protection money" to the city police. Black-uniformed policemen held the children away with German rifles on which bayonets had been fixed.

The eyes of intelligent China are now turned to the San Francisco Conference. Their eyes are on the Chinese delegation. It was a great honor for China to have been asked to co-sponsor the invitations. Yet many ask whether the Chinese delegates shall speak for China or for Chiang. Many ask whether it matters that the sole Communist delegate cannot speak English. Many ask whether this delegate is actually representative of Yenan.

As regards the conference itself, China is particularly interested in regional security and, to quote one newspaper, the "maintenance of territorial integrity." And by all means, the Chinese say, Russia should be persuaded to be a member of any regional security system in the Far East.

Somewhere in China

SERGEANT R. S.

The Bandwagon

Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo of Japan said yesterday at a press conference in Tokyo that his country considers the recent offer of Heinrich Himmler to surrender to the United States and Great Britain but not to the Soviet Union "an extreme violation" of the tripartite pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and that as a result Japan reserves the right "to reexamine all her relations with the German Reich." — *From the New York Herald Tribune.*

"Dear, I'm confused. What is a 'liberal,' anyway?"

"A 'liberal' today means someone who supports Russian, English, French and Dutch imperialism—but is against America First." — *Dialogue in a cartoon by Batchelor, in the Washington Times-Herald.*

Dr. V. Orval Watts, economic counsel for the Los Angeles group [the Chamber of Commerce], told the House Banking Committee that rejection of the agreements would bring "measurably nearer" the day of "returning liberty, lasting prosperity, and peace." The United States is not in a position "to afford the luxury of supporting a worldwide RFC or WPA such as is contemplated in the Bretton Woods agreements," he said. — *From the Chicago Tribune.*

That All-Out Effort

A big question mark punctuated the speculation about General Omar N. Bradley, commanding general in Europe, and one of the first top generals to get into action in Tunisia late in 1942. To some, his outstanding record in the field there suggested that he might be found most valuable at a desk job in Washington

instead of one in the Pacific area. — *From the New York Herald Tribune.*

On the Home Front

At that time Mr. Settevig denounced newspaper articles which described living conditions as uninhabitable and played up the prevalence of rats and roaches. He spoke against rent ceilings and other regulations harassing property owners and complained about building and other inspectors.

"As long as men are in foxholes, why should Minneapolis demand first-class housing?" he asked. — *From the Minnesota Daily.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; \$1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of the New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. — THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Appeasement at San Francisco

SIR: Admitted that I cannot know the pressures that sway diplomats, I still think I have a right to express despair and astonishment at the seating of the Argentine representatives at San Francisco.

Appeasement wrecked the world. Argentina has been appeased.

No matter how many good minor clauses and practical agreements are being hammered out at San Francisco, no matter how pleasant is the smile of Mr. Molotov, he knows and we know that the high sign has been given to the old crowd, the gathering vultures are on the way down. A great moral wrong has been done, openly and brazenly. And it is just as if all the fine oratory had never been uttered, as if the fear of fascism were forgotten, as if the idealists, including "the few who did so much for so many," had been played for suckers again.

So, even if Argentina is appeased, we the people are not. We didn't think of San Francisco as a gathering that would be dominated by the ghost of Chamberlain. We didn't expect to have to be grateful for crumbs of liberal action. For once we thought we had earned the right *in blood and money*, to representation. And we hoped that the ideals of the man we voted into power for sixteen straight years might have lasted long enough to have kept the fascists in his backyard from being invited to the first party he planned for the world of tomorrow.

Bronxville, N. Y.

HORTENSE FLEXNER

Staff Sergeant in Germany

SIR: The Frenchman who took me through the Buchenwald camp looked on almost amusedly while the German was declaiming the horrors of the torture chamber we were in. The German was passionately arrogant in his denunciation, while the Americans who were listening to him looked at the marks left on the walls by toes frenziedly trying to grip them, on the hooks from which people had hung, on the chair against which people had been whipped. The German screamed on, while the Frenchman and I looked at each other and then walked away, through the cremation-furnace room, with charred skeletons still in the ovens, through a driving rainstorm to the pathological museum where tattooed human skin had been hardened into lampshades for the SS commandant's wife. Then we went into the French barracks, where everything had been cleaned up, and butter was beside every plate and good French stew was cooking, and people smiled through gaunt bones, and I started crying. I said, "La

France en Allemagne," and they said, "*Une colonie Française,"* and then we all sat down and talked. I said, "How was it? Was it really awful?" And these horrors of men, these skeletons of men, sort of grinned and said, "It really wasn't so bad; we could take it," and through the window could be seen the monument hurriedly put together of wood to the 51,000 men who had died at Buchenwald.

In the meantime the Polish woman correspondent who had come with me, a London Pole, was busy with the Poles. I like her very much, even though I despise her politics. When we went away from the camp (where, by the way, the chief of her bureau had been a prisoner for years, and you should have seen the hand-kissing, the bowing around, that took place between this handsome, elegant woman and these walking bones and rags), she told me that she had seen nothing of the camp, because as she explained it, these men considered her a Polish woman, and Polish women should be spared indelicate sights.

We've all just come back from Leipzig, where for four days I ran a press camp all by myself. I got up at six, started a fire, cooked breakfast, fed the correspondents, briefed them, conducted them, showed them our bomb damage, kept them from trouble, worried about them, waited for them, laughed at them, abused them, yelled at them, fed them again, practically put them to bed at night and guarded them. You should hear their arguments and discussions at night, as limited as the editorials in their newspapers, even more, because we have no news as we go along, we know nothing of what is happening except in our sector, and I suppose when I get back home I'll have to spend weeks reading back copies of the *New York Times*.

But about Leipzig—not very ruined, and thousands of freed slaves, like waves all over the place, and a lot of isolated shooting. I lay on my downstairs couch and listened to the fusillade, and worried about our cars parked in the yard and was too lazy to get up and look at them. I don't like a lot of my work, some of which consists of going ahead of our crowd and looking for houses and searching houses, with German women desperately looking on, and then deciding on a house, and telling the people they have to be out of the house by a certain time, and then going into the emptied house and looking for beds and looking for cooking utensils and china and silverware, and worrying about the water—sometimes there is no water, and if there is, worrying whether any of the mains are broken and is the water pure. A lot of what I'm writing to you you've probably already read, because I see what the correspondents see, but I insist they don't understand the significance of it. And do I? Maybe I will some day.

I'm a terrible sucker for human dignity. That's one of the reasons I don't like the Germans: they cannot be dignified without an artificial backbone, a Hitler, a title such as professor or doctor. You should have seen the ragged Frenchman, dressed in the long stripes of a prisoner, naturally ugly and unnaturally thin, and dirty, and with no teeth, you should have seen his dignity. The Germans go to pieces, they smile, they cringe, the hell with them. All the Poles and the Russians want is to go home. But the other day we were at a slave camp for Russians, surrounded by a mob, and I was translating in my limited Russian, when suddenly the crowd parted and two young Red Army men, prisoners of war, just walked through, grinning broadly and shaking the hands of every one of us, and as we drove away they stood a little way off at attention and gave us terrific salutes.

We usually establish a base, such as the one in Weimar, and then run forward sorties such as the one I ran into Leipzig. The scene at the railroad station there: the station had a world-famous restaurant and an enormous cellar, and we put guards on them. But they are having a hell of a time, because the freed slaves all want to celebrate, and one Belgian girl begged me, "Please give us a bottle, I lost my husband and my home, but I want to be happy because the Americans have come." I wish to hell I could be with the troops that are going into Czecho-Slovakia, because I

want to be liberating again, and not conquering. It's no fun to be a conqueror, particularly of Germans. God, I hate them, and it's not Buchenwald that made me hate them, but years ago when I went into a Danzig beer place, and when they saw me they started singing a song, which was "Jews, get out of here." I hate the bastards and to hell with them, and to hell with Weimar, home of Goethe, and to hell with Goethe. I'll take France, I'll take America and Russia. I hope I never see this place again after I'm out of the army.

Weimar, Germany

STAFF SERGEANT N. A.

Franco and Censorship

SIR: It is high time our State Department began to exercise a close censorship on press and radio news from France concerning the precarious tenure of Franco in Spain. Having apparently no present lead from the British Foreign Office concerning Spain, such as it has enjoyed in the past, and being perhaps preoccupied with the problem of an eventual apology for its antics concerning the Argentine colonels, our State Department is neglecting what may prove to be a source of increasingly serious embarrassment to itself and to us all.

It is a little late now to explain to the State Department, and particularly to its Catholic members, who may still be sympathetic to the policies and methods of this devout son of the Church, that of the three comrades in fascism—Hitler, Mussolini and Franco—it is Franco who remains the most repulsive and monstrously sadistic of all; for it is he, only, who imported aliens for the purpose of murdering and torturing his own people.

New York City

TERENCE HOLLIDAY

The GI Assault Bill

SIR: Servicemen have been assaulted by civilians on a number of occasions. Some of them have even been killed. When the assaults are against Negroes and in the South it is sometimes hard to get the state and local authorities to prosecute. The Department of Justice has no authority to protect servicemen, for assault and even murder are crimes against the state, not against the federal government. Accordingly, a bill, S. 1227, has been introduced in Congress to make assaults on servicemen a federal crime. The NAACP is supporting it. We urge your support as well by writing to your Senators and Representatives to vote for it.

CONSUELO C. YOUNG, Director of Publicity,

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
New York City

From The New Republic Mail Bag

The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, Inc., of 120 Broadway, New York 5, writes to us about its \$1,267,600 physical-therapy-training program. The Foundation will award 1,000 scholarships for the free training of new physical therapists, badly needed to care for wounded veterans and victims of industrial accidents, as well as those afflicted with infantile paralysis. Qualified persons interested in this work are urged to write to the Foundation for further information.

Anyone possessing letters of Thomas Wolfe is asked to lend them to Maxwell E. Perkins, of Charles Scribner's Sons, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, to be copied for publication in a projected collection of Wolfe's letters. Originals will be returned to the owner promptly.

A new pamphlet in support of the Bretton Woods proposals is the first in a pamphlet-a-month series to be issued by the CIO Political Action Committee. A quarter of a million copies of "Bretton Woods Is No Mystery" are now being distributed. The PAC will follow this with other pamphlets on vital national and international questions.

Books in Review

Chinese Primer

HERE IS a book¹ that gets down to cases on the problem of postwar China. Mr. Rowe, Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies at Yale, has taken for his theme the problem of how soon and by what means China can become an industrial and military great power so as to assume a genuine position as one of the Big Four in the projected postwar security organization. In the course of his argument he presents a documented evaluation of China as she is today, and as she is developing under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. He also makes recommendations for a United States postwar policy in the Far East.

Mr. Rowe assesses China's resources and concludes that in order to build up a modern state, China will have to start from scratch. He points out that today China is not only not a great power; she is not even a united nation, nor, until very recently, even an independent sovereign power. The author describes China as a vast territory with no adequate communications, so that she is regional in her loyalties, with little sense of national unity. Even today, in unoccupied China, there is no generally accepted effective central government. One of the first problems, therefore, he believes, is to unify the country under some acceptable regime, and tie it together with modern transportation and a nationalistic ideology.

The second basic problem is economic. Mr. Rowe finds that China's vast population is a liability rather than an asset. Her economy is still agrarian. Some 70 to 80 percent of the people get their living from cultivating the soil, yet because of an exploitative landowning and taxation system, an "estimated 70 percent of the population [live] under such conditions of poverty as barely to be able to survive." Moreover, he feels, the existence of a vast reservoir of poverty-stricken laborers will work against the development of health and labor standards necessary for industrial efficiency. China, he finds, is less well off than has been popularly supposed in natural resources, and is short on native capital. Up to now, industrialization has barely begun. In prewar China foreigners controlled three-quarters of industrial capital. Railways, too, were for the most part built with foreign funds and were routed to serve the foreign spheres of influence rather than the needs of the Chinese. During the war there has been a start at small industrialization in Free China. The "Communists" have made a small-scale start. All of this, however, is remote from the problem of major state power.

Mr. Rowe believes that in the postwar period China will continue to depend largely on foreign help. He feels that with the passing of the "unequal treaties" and with government control of modernization, China may accept such foreign help with safety. It is obvious, however, that if the

foreign powers are not wise, disinterested and generous, it will be difficult not to perpetuate all the former evils.

On the very important problem of who is best fitted to control China's postwar government, the Kuomintang or the Chinese "Communists," Mr. Rowe takes the position that the basic issue is economic rather than political. He feels that for at least a generation the form of China's government will be oligarchic regardless of who controls it. The claims of rival oligarchic groups must be assessed in terms of their special service to China.

The value of Chiang Kai-shek to China, Mr. Rowe believes, lies in his military ability—learned at Japanese army schools—and his skill at political maneuvering. He describes Chiang as a mediator who has kept various opposing factions in a kind of equilibrium. He sees him, too, as an opportunist who can change his policy to conform to a changing picture. Mr. Rowe considers Chiang an important symbol of national unity so that, despite the dubious methods by which he won and holds power, he implies that Chiang is the leader most likely to head the postwar Chinese government. The Chinese "Communists" do not, according to Mr. Rowe, represent any new or foreign ideology. Instead they represent merely the traditional peasants' revolt against intolerable conditions. Because of this, the Communist program appeals to the masses of Chinese people and their program cannot be ignored if China is to become a stable nation. Mr. Rowe seems to suggest that, under our steering, the Kuomintang oligarchy can be gradually displaced or controlled, and Chiang can be used as the leader symbol to unite the nation behind the development of industrial-military power, while certain basic reforms for the welfare of the people are simultaneously carried out.

From his analysis Mr. Rowe concludes that China will not be able within 25 years to build up an industrial and military power adequate to protect her own security and to police Asia. He recommends therefore that we assume the job. He proposes that the United Nations deal so severely with Japan that she cannot possibly emerge as a military threat. He proposes further that the United States maintain its present paramount military power, with peacetime conscription, and build and maintain numerous bases on islands taken from Japan in the South Pacific and near China. Troops, he feels, must be kept in Korea but here ours might be augmented by those of other United Nations. He proposes, in short, that we build up a sort of military Great Wall to protect China while we help her build up her industrial and military power.

As a factual study this volume is of the greatest possible usefulness. Mr. Rowe was born in China and has spent most of his life there as a student of Chinese history, culture and modern development. There is every reason to accept his analysis as authoritative. There is every reason to believe that his policy recommendations are based on a genuine concern for the welfare of China. If, therefore, his recommendations seem unlikely to accomplish his objectives, it is largely because the objectives themselves are mutually in-

¹ China Among the Powers, by David Nelson Rowe. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 205 pages. \$2.

compatible. He wishes basic reforms for the welfare of the Chinese people; and he wishes China to become a modern industrial-military state to take its place as one of the Big Four. To accomplish the first objective one type of leadership and program would be necessary; for the second, an entirely different type. A failure to face this dilemma squarely gives his policy-decisions a quality of wishful thinking at extreme variance with his hard-headed analysis.

All will agree that in the postwar period the Chinese government must improve living conditions for the people, and that China will need foreign help to do this. The welfare of the people, however, would require general agrarian reforms, the mobilization of resources locally to promote a widely distributed small-scale consumer industry, the development of transport and utilities locally for domestic use, and a widely extended program of education and health. On the other hand, in order to develop a modern state power on the Big Four scale would require the mobilization of resources to create a centralized heavy-industry and export-trade regime to serve an actual and potential military organization. Mr. Rowe appears to believe that both programs could be carried out simultaneously. On the facts of his own analysis this seems highly improbable. China literally cannot afford both guns and butter.

The decision as to which sort of modernization program will be undertaken and under whose leadership, will have to be made at the conclusion of the war. This decision should be made by the Chinese people. It should be made before we further strengthen the power now held by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. As things stand now, despite our good intentions, we are stacking the cards against the Chinese

people. As Mr. Rowe points out, the position of Chiang and the Kuomintang in China has been enormously strengthened by the financial help and diplomatic prestige given Chiang by Britain and America as part of the war strategy against Japan. Despite this, however, his influence is still largely confined to the Kuomintang oligarchy and the limited areas patrolled by his national armies. Mr. Rowe suggests that, regardless of this, we should continue to deal with Chiang as a symbol of Chinese unity. If we do so, however, without an overwhelming popular mandate, Chiang is likely to become to millions of Chinese a symbol, not of unity, but of continued foreign domination.

The suggestion that Chiang might be an acceptable leader for postwar China must be viewed with considerable skepticism. It seems remote from reality to expect that he would work either for the people's welfare or for the cause of international peace. Regardless of his former ability to change friends and shift position, it is not possible to believe that he would, under any circumstances, foster with sincerity the agrarian revolution against which he has used force of arms for the entire eighteen years of his domination. Nor is it realistic to expect him to forgo the dizzy possibility of building up a modern military machine, since his entire political career is based on military power, and since his prestige among the big-power leadership rests on his military talent. The suggestion that, under our guidance, it might be possible gradually to detach Chiang from the Kuomintang oligarchy also seems non-realistic. To create a modern state power, Chiang would need the cooperation of the landlords, bankers and industrialists who make up that oligarchy.

On the basis of Mr. Rowe's own analysis the conclusion is inescapable that if China is to become one of the Big Four in terms of industrial-military strength and potential she will continue to develop the sort of centralized state regime usually called fascist, and which is the sort of government China has now and which we recognize. If we continue, in the postwar period, to strengthen such a regime, we must be prepared to take the consequences. To say that China has not the resources to become a threat to world peace is to overlook the fact that China has infinitely more resources than Japan had. To say that China cannot, within a quarter-century, build up a first-class military power is to forget that Japan, with a third-class state machine, was able to do considerable damage on a raiding expedition.

Mr. Rowe minimizes the possibility of this sort of development in China, basing his decision on the "individualism" of the Chinese character. This seems extremely unrealistic. We are able by now to see that the struggle of a small nation confronted by the blitz of a powerful neighbor is bound to be futile, no matter how heroic. It would be sensible if we could understand that it is equally true that the mass of ordinary people in a modern state are equally helpless against a modern state apparatus once it has decided on totalitarian procedures and brutalities. With Chiang and the Kuomintang launched on a program to extend their government throughout China, we may expect the extreme suppression of dissenters that all totalitarian governments appear to accept as normal procedure, and which, in any case, has been a feature of Chiang's regime from its inception.

As for the recommendation that we must advance, in full military force, into the South Pacific region, and Asia, while simultaneously reshaping China into a modern great power,

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this must be examined for all its implications before we accept it as the best answer. As long as we maintain a dominant military force in regions so remote from our shores and so close to Asia we must expect that to large numbers of Chinese, and other Asiatics, our help to China's government may not look so disinterested as it will to us. Moreover, we are likely to arouse antagonism in the great powers which are now our allies. We can hardly ourselves occupy innumerable new island bases while we recommend the abolition of their colonies for our European allies; and say hands-off Manchuria to Russia.

If this discussion seems to ignore the problem of China's national security, it is because our current search for "collective security," if it is to have any reality, must be in terms of progressively freeing peoples from the burden of military establishments. The current acceptance of the idea, even by liberal opinion, that in the postwar world the war-weary starving peasants of China must be saddled with the expense of a modern military machine suggests a certain lack of confidence in the good intentions of the major powers. In the postwar world, with Japan's military power destroyed—as it will be—China need fear aggression only from her current allies, Britain, the USSR and the United States. If the great powers are sincerely "peace-loving," China will not need a big-power military establishment. If they are not, none she can hope to create for half a century will save her.

The questions raised by Mr. Rowe's discussion are important far beyond their narrow application to China. The basic objectives for nations everywhere today are the people's welfare, national security and international peace. As long as we consider the first two problems to be identical, and as long as we continue to define national security in terms of national state power, we can expect the last objective to remain illusory.

HELEN MEARS

A Greek Poet in England

New Writing and Daylight: Autumn, 1944. Foreword by John Lehmann. London: The Hogarth Press. 175 pages. Ten shillings, sixpence.

THIS VOLUME of *New Writing and Daylight* includes an excellent story by V. S. Pritchett; two poems by Stephen Spender, one by Henry Reed (in which Philoctetes apparently joins the army); three interesting articles on the Polish, Chinese and Nazi theatre by Tymon Terlecki, Harold Acton and Heinrich Fischer, respectively; translations of four poems by Leopardi, very faithfully done (a little too much so) by John Heath-Stubbs (his interest in the most freezingly desperate of European poets of the nineteenth century might be significant); a poem, "The Jungle," by the late Alun Lewis, in which the dissolution of all meaning, "vituperations of the just" and "old temptations to remold the world" in front of the naked face of Nature are consistently expressed; and several noteworthy pieces of poetry and prose by Peter Yates, Dunstan Thompson, Stanislaw Balinski and others. French literature is represented by translations from Gide and Saint Exupéry. But the most important part of the volume is certainly the one devoted by the editors to a young Greek poet who died an exile in England in 1944, at the age of 32: Demetrios

Capetanakis. Surely, none of the other contributors to this anthology will resent the fact that the reader becomes interested in the personality of Capetanakis to the point of unwittingly pushing the rest into the background.

There is very little by Capetanakis himself in this volume: a lecture on modern Greek poetry; the poem "Abel," quoted in its entirety by Edith Sitwell in a very delicate essay on the young poet, together with fragments from other poems; another complete poem, "Lazarus," quoted by John Lehmann in his article; and what Panayotis Canellopoulos and William Plomer, who had been his friends, tell us about him. Hardly enough to form a clear image. But "Abel," "Lazarus" and the theme of the lecture on Greek poetry are so significant and clear that, although one is aware that he knows very little about Demetrios Capetanakis, still one is tempted to retrace the wake of his spiritual odyssey and some lineaments of his personality.

Demetrios Capetanakis, his friend Canellopoulos tells us, went from Athens to Heidelberg to study; from Heidelberg he went back to Athens, and from Athens, in 1939, to Cambridge. In England, he became an English poet. While in Germany, he was very much under the spell of Stefan George, which later he got rid of. The influence of Heidegger, on the other hand, seems to have been deep and lasting. Besides poetry, he had written essays on Rimbaud, Dostoevsky, and notes on contemporary writers. He planned essays on Plato, Kierkegaard, modern American literature. The book he was preparing would have had the title *The Shores of Darkness*. His friend Plomer says that "at least in private life, Demetrios, unlike many Greeks, showed little interest in politics. His feelings about the war and his country were probably too deep to be expressed." He died in a hospital bed endowed to the memory of Neville Chamberlain. And John Lehmann tells us that "When he was unable to read anything else, even in his own language, he could still read Dickens. *Our Mutual Friend* was, I think, the last book he read before his death, and he found it, in his own phrase, 'a most wonderful book.'"

Heidegger's metaphysics is candidly present in Capetanakis' prose: "Nothingness might save or destroy those who face it, but those who ignore it are condemned to unreality. They cannot pretend to a real life, which if it is full of real risks, is also full of real promises," he writes in the concluding sentence of his essay on Rimbaud. And, passing judgment on Stefan George: "[His mind] was too much of one piece to understand the dialectic mystery of existence, whose reality is born of nothingness, whose light comes from darkness, whose greatest hope is brought about by utmost despair." However, the stress on promise, hope, and the falseness implicit in being "of one piece," like the love for Dickens, is not necessarily Heideggerian. And in another fragment, through existentialist terminology one feels the presence of Plato's shadow: "The more questionable everything appears, the more unquestionable the truth of something in man's existence, revealed by suffering and the awareness of nothingness, becomes."

Any special terminology becomes unnecessary when Capetanakis reaches poetry. In the "Introduction to Modern Greek Poetry," in which he stresses "the attitude of absolute freedom in facing Death with courage" as characteristic of modern Greek poets, existentialism becomes simply the Greek sense of life: awareness of human limits

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and at the same time refusal of resignation, as Capetanakis so well says—a sense expressed with marvelous clarity in the “Ballad of the Young Man and Death,” of which Capetanakis gives a beautiful translation.

“Lazarus” and “Abel,” the two poems here quoted in full, are enough to convince us that Capetanakis’ own work is worthy of the great theme in which he found the essence of Greek poetry. In Edith Sitwell’s words, “‘Abel’ is an extraordinary poem, packed with meaning, and of a terrifying depth, comprehension and concentration.” One would like to add that it is also, as far as one knows, the most human, significant and noble, poem inspired by the present war.

These few fragments of Demetrios Capetanakis’ personality leave us with the impression of having come near to some of the most intimate spiritual themes in the experience of the younger European generation—a generation which will have little left, if not moral purity and intellectual dignity.

NICOLA CHIAROMONTE

Counter-Attack

The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education. Papers from the Second Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith. New York: King's Crown Press. 164 pages. \$2.50.

THE SECOND Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, held in New York last year, had three purposes: “to resist the method of authority and the forces of authoritarianism”; “to bridge the gaps separating specialists in different fields of inquiry and interest”; and to point out “ways in which scientific method can and ought to play an integral part in the shaping of democratic policy.”

This varied and ambitious program no doubt made for a lively conference, but one cannot be surprised to discover that the collection of conference papers is not a unified volume. There is, for example, a section on communication, and although Dr. Gideonse makes an effort to relate the topic to the purposes of the gathering, the two papers—one by Bruce Bliven on the press and one by Bernard B. Smith on the radio—turn out to be rather detailed and technical discussions, each excellent in its own way but neither concerned with the principal business of the conference.

In general, however, the contributions have a single focus: most of the contributors are acutely conscious that Messrs. Hutchins, Barr, Adler, Van Doren, and so on, are exerting a considerable influence on that section of the American public that is concerned with education. The conferees are men who believe in the importance of teaching the sciences and inculcating the scientific spirit. They do not believe in the authority of a church or the authority of a particular literary or philosophical tradition. They do not wish to see liberal education for the few and vocational training for the many. And they are worried.

Certain of the papers—those by John Dewey, Sidney Hook, Arthur Murphy and Irwin Edman—are direct attacks on the Chicago-St. John’s position. Murphy’s piece in particular is a lively and shrewd polemic against the hundred best books. Professor Murphy, as he showed in his *Uses of Reason*, is a fighting logician, and if he has something of

the logician's love of scoring points, he is the kind of critic the Barrs and Van Dorens need.

Criticism on this level, however, is not enough. Practically speaking, the appeal of the Hutchins school lies not in the character of its positive program but in the fact that it has a positive program to offer after it has pointed with horror to the prevailing chaos in education. So much of what Hutchins and his colleagues say about American colleges is true that the unwary reader, like a patient who has been scared by his doctor, is willing to try any medicine that is prescribed.

What have the believers in the scientific spirit to offer in competition with the Chicago dogmas? Murphy points out that our American tradition of freedom has its glories, even if they are not recognized by the St. John's curriculum. John Dewey and Floyd Allport speak of the humanizing values of scientific knowledge. Irwin Edman observes that both science and the great books have a part in education. And not one of the contributors—except A. J. Carlson in a paragraph or two—exhibits the arrogance by which scientists have so often discredited science.

Yet one looks in vain in the major papers for a positive program to match Hutchins' or for the general overhauling of educational methods that might precede the emergence of such a program. In the discussions, however, one feels a ground swell of discontent. Here, for example, is V. T. Thayer of the Ethical Culture Schools, reminding us that there is danger not only in Mr. Hutchins' "education for freedom" but also in the widespread though less publicized "education for adjustment," a type vigorously stimulated by the superficial successes of army and navy training methods. Here is Morris Meister of the Bronx High School of Science, rising to point out that bad teaching conditions and bad teachers strip scientific courses of the humanizing values they are supposed to have. Here is Dr. Pilley of Wellesley, saying that education should give "a vision of personal and social excellence." Here is Dean Carman of Columbia, talking about the spiritual bankruptcy of too many Americans, and saying, "It does not take much thought or analysis to see that education has failed because it has been primarily technical, vocational and professional rather than esthetic, moral and religious." And finally here is Comfort A. Adams, professor emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Harvard University, who speaks of "the importance and vitality of those basic laws of human relationships which have come down to us through four thousand years of recorded history."

What these random references indicate is the presence at the conference of men who know that colleges can recognize the importance of science and can be free from religious dogma and still fail to give anything that deserves to be called an education. As I suggested some weeks ago in a review that touched on the same topic, I do not believe that the low estate of American secondary and college education should be attributed directly to the incompetence of educators. On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to say that the majority of teachers have responded brilliantly to the challenge of the new burdens laid on the schools. Most of them needed to be brought up short by just that passionate devotion to half-truths that Hutchins and his followers exhibit. The first reaction is naturally defensive, but there is some self-searching going on too, and I think there will be more.

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DUELL, SLOAN AND PEARCE

In the current debate each side charges the other with actual or incipient totalitarianism, just as do the advocates of free enterprise and the advocates of planning. In either instance there is truth on both sides, though I would not say it was equally distributed. The point is, I suppose, that we are in a situation in which the danger of totalitarianism is all around us. Despite the talk about education for freedom, the whole Hutchins scheme hinges on the imposition of a particular set of values, and "authoritarian" is no misnomer. On the other hand, much education that has called itself scientific and progressive has ignored, if it has not denied, the human values on which democracy must rest. I am not intimating that the men who participated in the conference could in any sense be considered totalitarian, but I wonder if some of them have not tolerated basically undemocratic tendencies in the curricula and in the administrations of the institutions in which they teach.

I believe, as I have implied, that the group represented at the conference needs to evolve a program that can compete with the Hutchins program, but this is not to say that I think there is a single narrow road to salvation. We need waste no time in trying to evolve an ideal curriculum that will perfectly inculcate the scientific spirit and a democratic faith. But out of a thorough reexamination of present shortcomings and future needs—the sort of thing to which this volume clearly points—could come convictions and aspirations that would dispose of the Hutchins school in a way that polemics will never do.

GRANVILLE HICKS

Germany: Nazi and Anti-Nazi

Drink to the Hunted, by Ellen Marsh. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 413 pages. \$3.

DRINK TO THE HUNTED is notable, as a first novel, for its ambitious scope—life in Germany from about 1920 to 1940—and thesis: not all Germans are Nazis. It tries either too hard (it is overly long, with a profusion of scenes and characters) or not hard enough (few of the scenes and characters are well developed) to cover the indicated ground, and succeeds, at best, in giving an understanding account of the relationship of Frederike Bailey to her parents, Bürgermeister and Aurelie Sondermann, and her daughter, German-American Laurie. The aftermath of Frederike's unhappy marriage to an American officer is traced through mother and daughter's extensive travels on the Continent, the succession of Frederike's lovers, and the conflict in Laurie between her American and German-Catholic heritage. Too much time is spent in establishing and repeating a fairly obvious pattern—personal disintegration and quarrels with Frederike's conservative parents—before Laurie's point of view finally emerges as the dominant one in the novel. The book grows considerably in interest when Miss Marsh begins to describe the changes in the lives of her characters brought on by Hitler's coming to power and the present war. But the Nazi and anti-Nazi characters are all rather dim beside Laurie and her mother, whose fortunes, in turn, remain insignificant in terms of the book's political theme. Which will probably not prevent this novel's being unjustifiably attacked (one reviewer in the *New York Times* Sunday Book Review has already done so) as propaganda for a soft peace.

ISAAC ROSENFELD

Sense about India

Strangers in India, by Penderel Moon. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock. 181 pages. \$2.

THIS COMPACT little volume is jam-packed with keen valuations of the many-faceted problem that is India today. The author, for 15 years an English civil servant in various Indian provinces, handles his subject matter engagingly. He begins his chapters with actual "grass-roots" experiences with natives under his jurisdiction. These episodes, described with warmth and understanding, effectively point up the ensuing discussions, which usually take the form of Socratic dialogues. Each chapter examines a significant aspect of the Indian problem. He sees the latter as stemming essentially from more than two centuries of British misrule—inescapable, perhaps in the light of the inherent dynamics of the historical situation, but none the less a fetter which has estranged most of the best elements in Indian life.

Mr. Moon indicates possible solutions which are both forward-looking and realistic. Foremost is the granting to India, on the cessation of hostilities, of complete independence. However, in thus entrusting India with her own destiny, Britain must also see to it that self-rule does not founder on the rocks of India's own internal problems. Probably outstanding among these is poverty. Mr. Moon proposes a long-term program for industrial and agricultural development based on a rapid extension of hydroelectric and irrigation schemes. The war has reversed India's position as a debtor vis-à-vis England and has given a fillip to Indian industry. Thus has been created a superb opportunity for a reconstruction of India's industrial pattern and a raising of the entire standard of living. An important desideratum is the complete reorganization of village life, possibly along the lines of coöperative societies, employing modern methods of agriculture and running small-scale village industries ancillary to agriculture. Basic to this reform is a new and comprehensive system of mass education.

In an interesting discussion of the princely Native States, the author advances the novel argument that many of them, being in the main free from exotic political forms imposed by England, best give expression to the Indian's "deep-seated respect for authority and for hereditary life." He envisages a possible political form for the entire country that will embody a type of constitutional-hereditary monarchy along democratic lines. Finally, there is a frank appraisal of the very complicated communal problem, with all the religious and political overtones of the seeming Hindu-Moslem impasse. This problem, as Mr. Moon sees it, is not insoluble. Once England has made it unmistakably clear that India is to have her independence, the sheer pressure of compulsion will force the conflicting elements to come to agreement.

It is refreshing to find complete candor on the Indian question on the part of an upper-class Englishman, particularly one who has been exposed, for long years, to the politically atrophying influences of the British Civil Service. Mr. Moon gives us a most welcome offset to Beverly Nichols' well publicized recent book, which provided a witty but completely biased picture. Mr. Moon looks at the same scene but through totally different glasses.

HARVEY J. BRESLER

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